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Ending Litigation and Financial
Windfalls on Time-Barred Debts
Marc C. McAllister*
Abstract
A trap for unsophisticated debtors, debt collectors often attempt
to collect time-barred debts through written offers to settle those
debts for a fraction of what is owed. Debtors typically respond to
such offers in one of four ways. First, some debtors simply pay the
offered settlement amount, usually 10%–40% of the total
outstanding debt, thereby satisfying the debt in full. Second, those
who wish to eliminate the debt but cannot pay the entire offered
settlement amount will instead make a small payment, unwittingly
reviving the statute of limitations on collections and making the
entire debt judicially enforceable for several years to follow. Third,
some debtors simply disregard the matter, which often leads to a
suit to collect the debt, where results range from the debtor owing
nothing (if he defends and asserts the statute of limitations defense)
to a judgment far exceeding the amount of the debt (if the debtor
does not defend and the matter is resolved by default judgment).
Finally, some debtors sue the collector for unlawful collection
efforts, where results vary based on the precise wording of the
collector’s offer letter and whether such an offer is deemed unlawful
in the debtor’s jurisdiction.
When a debtor exercises either of the first two options, the result
is a windfall to collectors, who might otherwise be unable to collect
on the debt due to the statute of limitations. When a debtor exercises
either of the final two options, already-overburdened courts are
swamped with difficult and unnecessary cases.
* Marc McAllister is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at Texas State
University. Professor McAllister has ten years of law school teaching experience
and has completed three federal judicial clerkships. His articles have been
published in the Florida State Law Review, Hofstra Law Review, Seattle Law
Review, Cincinnati Law Review, Penn State Law Review, and Case Western
Reserve Law Review, among others.
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This Article proposes a series of reforms designed to ease the
burden on courts while generating financial outcomes that are
roughly the same for all time-barred debts. For written attempts to
collect time-barred debts, this Article proposes warnings informing
the debtor that the statute of limitations has run on the debt and
that any payment will reset the limitations period for its entire
amount, as well as an opportunity for the debtor to pay the proposed
settlement amount, and no more, in installments.
As an additional layer of protection, this Article proposes an
amendment to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)
plainly declaring that suing to collect on a time-barred debt violates
the FDCPA, along with another amendment clarifying that it is
lawful for a collector to seek repayment on a time-barred debt
outside of court, but only if the notices and promises proposed above
are included in the collector’s written settlement offer.
As a final layer of protection, this Article proposes changes to
existing rules that deem the statute of limitations defense waived
unless asserted. Under this proposal, a plaintiff attempting to
collect an old debt would be required to prove, with evidence, that a
debt is not time-barred in order to obtain a judgment, default or
otherwise, in the case. As a backstop to this proposal, this Article
further proposes that courts screen all motions for default
judgments in consumer debt suits and dismiss those cases where
the plaintiff fails to prove the suit is timely.
In combination, these proposals will resolve the present circuit
split on the lawfulness of collection efforts on time-barred debts,
make financial outcomes more uniform across similarly-situated
debtors, and ensure that most collection activity on time-barred
debts occurs outside the judicial process, alleviating courts of this
burdensome litigation.
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I. Introduction

Americans have a lot of debt,1 and often experience difficulties
paying their debts.2 These circumstances have given rise to the
13.7 billion dollar debt collection industry, which includes
approximately 6,000 collection agencies,3 affects nearly 77 million
Americans,4 and is one of the fastest growing industries today.5
Much debt collector revenue derives from medical debt,
student loans, credit cards, student loans, and mortgages.6 When
consumers are unable to pay their debts, debt owners typically
deem the consumer in default, and eventually “charge off” the debt
and place it in collection.7 Collection efforts may then be made by
1. As of November 2016, the Federal Reserve reported that Americans have
$3.75 trillion in consumer debt. See Federal Reserve, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES.
SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/current/default.htm#fn1a (last
updated Oct. 6, 2017) (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (detailing outstanding consumer
credit from 2012 to present) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
This data covers most credit extended to individuals, excluding loans secured by
real estate. Id. Of this amount, $2.76 trillion consists of non-revolving debt, such
as student and vehicle loans, whereas $992.4 billion consists of revolving debt,
which includes credit card debt. Id. In addition, as of September 30, 2012, about
$1.01 trillion of consumer debt was delinquent and $740 billion was seriously
delinquent (at least 90 days late). See Conor P. Duffy, A Sum Uncertain:
Preserving Due Process and Preventing Default Judgments in Consumer Debt
Buyer Lawsuits in New York, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1147, 1152 n.15 (2013)
(reporting Federal Reserve data).
2. See, e.g., Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some
Cautionary Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 355,
355 (2012) (describing one debtor’s experience regarding a credit card debt she
was unable to pay after having become ill and unable to work).
3. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FIN. PROT., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT:
CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT],
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-practicesact.pdf.
4. See id. (noting a recent study finding that 35% of Americans, more than
77 million people, had a trade line on their credit reports indicating some type of
debt in collections).
5. See Neil L. Sobol, Protecting Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44
N.M. L. REV. 327, 333–38 (2014) (examining the rapid growth in the debt
collection industry); Fox, supra note 2, at 357 (noting that “[t]he debt industry is
one of the few booming industries left in America”).
6. 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 8–9.
7. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented
Consumer, 73 MO. L. REV. 707, 713–14 (2008) (noting that 6% of all personal credit

ENDING LITIGATION AND FINANCIAL WINDFALLS

453

the original creditor or present owner of the debt (called first-party
debt collectors), or by third-party debt collectors consisting of both
debt collection firms and law firms that specialize in such
collection efforts.8
More than half of third-party collector revenue, $7.5 billion, is
generated by collectors contracting with creditors to collect their
debts on a contingency fee basis under which any amount collected
is split between the creditor and collector.9 Under such
arrangements, collectors’ fees may increase based on the age of the
accounts.10 In general, older accounts offer larger fees, creating
incentives to use more aggressive collection tactics.11 Because
third-party debt collectors seek to collect as much money as they
can on old debts for themselves and their creditor clients, their
interests are adverse to consumers.12 In addition, as compared to
creditors, who compete for consumer business, third-party debt
collectors may be relatively unconcerned with their reputation
amongst consumers.13 For these reasons, third-party debt
collectors have little market incentive to attempt to collect debts in

card accounts are charged off annually); Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt
Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 52 (2015) (explaining that “[a] charge-off has no
effect on the validity or enforceability of the debt; it is simply an accounting
procedure”).
8. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67489 (proposed Nov.
12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
9. See 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 9 (“About one third of
debt collection revenue, $4.4 billion, comes from debt buyers, who purchase
accounts from the original creditor or other debt buyers and then generally seek
to collect on that debt, either themselves or through third-party debt collector.”).
10. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1159 (citing FRED WILLIAMS, FIGHT BACK
AGAINST UNFAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: KNOW YOUR RIGHTS AND PROTECT
YOURSELF FROM THREATS, LIES AND INTIMIDATION 74 (2011)) (stating that the
longer fees go uncollected, the greater chance your fees will increase).
11. See id. at 1159 (discussing the consequences of growing fees).
12. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SMALL BUSINESS REVIEW PANEL FOR
DEBT COLLECTOR AND DEBT BUYING RULEMAKING: OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS UNDER
CONSIDERATION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED, 1 (2016) [hereinafter CFPB
OUTLINE
OF
PROPOSALS],
http://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/documents/20160727_cfpb_Outline_of_proposals.pdf (showing that
debt collection remains a major source of consumer complaints, lawsuits, and
enforcement actions).
13. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67849.
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a non-aggressive manner, generating a need to regulate their
practices.14
In 1977, in light of the “abundant evidence of the use of
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many
debt collectors,”15 Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act (FDCPA) to govern the collection efforts of
third-party debt collectors.16 When the FDCPA was enacted, one of
Congress’s stated purposes was to “eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors.”17 Despite this ambitious
goal, significant debt collection problems have persisted.18 One
such problem is the attempted collection of debts that cannot be
judicially enforced due to expiration of the statute of limitations on
the debt (“time-barred debts”),19 an issue that has created a recent
circuit split20 and is the focus of this Article.
A trap for unsophisticated consumers, debt collectors often
attempt to collect time-barred debts by offering debtors the
opportunity to “settle” such debts for a fraction of the amount
owed.21 In such offers, debt collectors usually fail to convey that the
14. See id. (“Firms . . . have a limited incentive to engage in less aggressive
tactics if those tactics lead to increased recovery of debts.”).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61).
16. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292 (1995) (explaining that the
FDCPA prohibits “debt collector[s]” from engaging in various collection practices);
15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6) (Westlaw) (defining the term “debt collector” to mean “any
person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly,
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another”); id. § 1692a(5) (limiting
“debt” to consumer debt, i.e., debts “arising out of . . . transaction[s]” that “are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
18. See Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67851 (“Consumers
have submitted more complaints to the FTC about debt collectors than any other
single industry.”).
19. A time-barred debt is one that is older than the applicable statute of
limitations. Id. at 67875. Such debt is also known as “stale” debt, or “out of
statute” debt. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF THE DEBT
BUYING INDUSTRY 42 n.174 (2013) [hereinafter FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING
INDUSTRY], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structureand-practices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf.
20. See infra Part V.C (discussing whether an offer to settle a time-barred
debt may violate the FDCPA).
21. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395–96 (6th
Cir. 2015) (examining a debt collector’s offer to settle a time-barred debt for
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debt is no longer enforceable in court; that it likely violates the
FDCPA for the collector to sue to collect the debt if the debtor does
not respond to the collector’s offer;22 and that a debtor who makes
a partial payment on the debt, however small, will revive the
statute of limitations on the debt and permit judicial recovery of
the entire balance for many years to follow.23
When a debtor receives an offer to settle a time-barred debt,
the debtor will usually exercise one of four options. First, some
debtors will simply pay the stated settlement amount in full,
thereby eliminating the debt. Second, debtors who are unable to
pay the full settlement amount, but wish to pay off the debt, will
instead pay a portion of the offered settlement, unwittingly
reviving the statute of limitations on the debt and obligating
themselves to pay the entire amount owed, which can now be
judicially enforced.24 A third group of debtors simply disregard all
collection efforts, even those made in litigation, setting up a
potential default judgment that will obligate the debtor to pay a
sum far in excess of the entire debt.25 Finally, some debtors will
take an aggressive approach by filing suit against the collector for
unlawful collection practices, often under the FDCPA.26 When such
debtor suits fail, debtors generally must pay litigation costs and
approximately 35% of the past due account balance on the debt).
22. See infra Part V.C (discussing the relevant case law and potential circuit
split).
23. See infra Part III.A (discussing the partial payment rule).
24. See, e.g., Yeiter v. Knights of St. Casimir Aid Soc’y, 607 N.W.2d 68, 71
(Mich. 2000) (explaining that, at least since 1885, “a partial payment [on a debt]
restarts the running of the limitation period unless it is accompanied by a
declaration or circumstance that rebuts the implication that the debtor by partial
payment admits the full obligation”).
25. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1165–66 (explaining that judgment amounts
on consumer debts often exceed the original amount of the debt due to interest,
fees, and legal costs; and noting that in New York, a judgment holder is entitled
to 9% annual statutory interest of the judgment pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW
§ 5004 (McKinney 2017)); Haneman, supra note 7, at 717 (reporting that, due to
added interest, litigation costs, and attorney’s fees, such cases can result in a
judgment amount of more than 300% of the amount originally owed).
26. See, e.g., Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 395–96 (describing a case where debtor
sued a collector under the FDCPA after debtor received a collection letter that
offered to settle her time-barred debt but did not notify her that Michigan’s
six-year statute of limitations had run or that partial payment would restart the
applicable statute of limitations).
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their own attorney fees.27 When such suits prevail, debtors recover
money themselves, sometimes hundreds of thousands of dollars.28
Due to a current circuit split involving such debtor suits, the
success of a debtor’s FDCPA claim will largely depend on the
jurisdiction where litigation ensues.29
Depending on a debtor’s knowledge of the complex and
interwoven laws governing time-barred debts, their willingness to
engage with a debt collector or participate in litigation over an old
debt,30 and other variables, such as whether the debtor believes the
debt is even valid,31 all four of the above options may seem
perfectly reasonable.32 Yet, some of these options, when exercised,
result in a financial windfall to the collector, who might otherwise
be prevented from collecting any portion of the debt due to the
statute of limitations. Others result in a windfall to the debtor, who
almost always incurred, yet failed to pay, a debt.33 Current laws
27. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1179 (2013) (concluding
that a district court may award costs to prevailing defendants in FDCPA cases
without finding that the plaintiff brought the case in bad faith and to harass).
28. See infra notes 142–161 and accompanying text (discussing law firms
suing debtors for time-barred debts).
29. See infra Part VI.C (discussing whether an offer to settle a time-barred
debt may violate the FDCPA); cf. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692i (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 115-61) (obligating debt collectors to file collection suits against consumers
either in the judicial district “in which such consumer signed the contract sued
upon” or “in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action”).
30. See Bernice Yeung, Some Lawyers Want to Keep Debt Collection Out of
the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/
us/23sfdebt.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (reporting that debtors often don’t
respond to collection efforts “because they don’t know how, and that’s how the
debt buyers make their money”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
31. See 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 18–19 (reporting that
the most common debt collection complaint received by the CFPB involves
continued attempts to collect a debt the consumer reports is not owed). Most of
those particular complaints report that the debt is not their debt (63%), while
others report that the debt was already paid (26%), resulted from identity theft
(6%), or was discharged in bankruptcy (4%). Id.
32. See generally Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 400 (6th
Cir. 2015) (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “a conscientious debtor”
who receives an offer to accept about 35 cents on the dollar of what she owed
would either accept this offer, simply ignore it, or even sue the collector for
making it).
33. There are some circumstances where the debt at issue is not valid, as in
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and judicial practices permit this range of results. With windfalls
around every corner, this patchwork of legal standards needs
repair.
Examining the debtor’s options in the order presented above,
Part II of this Article examines the lawfulness of non-judicial
collection efforts on time-barred debts and examines the initial
scenario where a debtor elects to pay a collector’s settlement offer
in full.34 Part III examines the second scenario where a debtor
makes a partial payment on the debt, including its impact on the
statute of limitations.35 Part IV reviews the third scenario where a
debtor fails to respond to collection efforts, including default
judgments being awarded against such debtors by over-burdened
courts.36 Part V examines the final scenario where a debtor sues
for unfair collection practices on time-barred debts, and
summarizes the current circuit split regarding suits against
collectors under the FDCPA.37 Finally, Part VI sets forth a series
of reforms for time-barred debts that will generate more uniform
outcomes on all such debts with minimal impact on courts.38 Part
VII concludes.39
II. Option 1: Paying the Full Offered Settlement Amount
The debt collection industry includes first-party collectors,
third-party collectors, and debt buyers.40 Debt buyers purchase
defaulted debt from original creditors or other debt owners, and
thereby take title to the debt.41 The older the debt, the less a debt
buyer will pay for it. According to an FTC Report from 2013:
the case of mistaken identity.
34. Infra Part II.
35. Infra Part III.
36. Infra Part IV.
37. Infra Part V.
38. Infra Part VI.
39. Infra Part VII.
40. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. 67848, 67489 (proposed Nov.
12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006).
41. FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 1, 47. To
conduct its study, the FTC obtained information about debts and debt buying
practices from nine of the largest debt buyers that collectively bought 76.1% of
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Debt buyers paid on average 3.1 cents per dollar of debt for
debts that were 3 to 6 years old and 2.2 cents per dollar of debt
for debts that were 6 to 15 years old compared to 7.9 cents per
dollar for debts less than 3 years old. Finally, debt buyers paid
effectively nothing for accounts that were older than fifteen
years.42

Once purchased, debt buyers will often either attempt to
collect the purchased debts themselves or employ third-party
collectors to collect the debts.43 Once collection efforts begin on
time-barred debts, which are typically more than three to six years
old,44 collectors will typically offer to settle those debts for 10%–
40% of the total amount owed.45
Although courts are split regarding the precise tactics a
collector may employ to collect a time-barred debt,46 most courts
agree that a statute of limitations bar does not actually extinguish
the debt itself.47 According to most courts, the debtor still owes the
the debt sold in 2008. Id. at i. As part of this study, these debt buyers submitted
data on more than 5,000 portfolios containing nearly 90 million consumer
accounts with a face value of $143 billion and which were acquired by debt buyers
for $6.5 billion. Id. at ii. Most portfolios for which debt buyers submitted data
were credit card debts, which accounted for 71% of the total amount that the
buyers spent to acquire debts. Id. at ii. The FTC also considered its prior
enforcement and policy work related to debt collection, as well as available
research concerning debt buying. Id. The study focused on large debt buyers
because they account for most of the debt purchased; it did not address the
practices of smaller debt buyers. Id. at i.
42. McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1022 (7th Cir. 2014);
see also Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 43
(2015) (explaining that the low cost at which debt buyers purchase debt reflects
the risk the buyer is taking that the debt will ultimately be uncollectible).
43. Debt Collection (Regulation F), 78 Fed. Reg. at 67850.
44. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 1941, at 11–29
(discussing the debt buying market and the process in which one can participate
in it).
45. In McMahon, for example, which consolidated two cases for appeal, one
collector offered to settle the debtor’s account for 40% of the total outstanding
balance. 744 F.3d at 1013. In the other case, the collector offered to settle the
debtor’s account for 30% of the amount due. Id. at 1014; see also Buchanan v.
Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2015) (examining an offer to
settle a time-barred debt for approximately 35% of the past due account balance
on the debt).
46. See infra Part VI.C (discussing whether an offer to settle a time-barred
debt may violate the FDCPA).
47. See Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 396–97 (noting that, under most states’ laws,
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debt; however, he has a complete legal defense against having to
pay it, which, when asserted, would simply prevent a debt owner
or collector from enforcing the debt in court.48
Because the debtor still owes a time-barred debt, most courts
agree that the statute of limitations does not prevent a debt owner
or collector from seeking to collect even the entire amount of the
debt outside of court, and that it is appropriate to do so.49 As the
“a debt remains a debt even after the statute of limitations has run on enforcing
it in court”).
48. See, e.g., Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011)
(stating, under New Jersey law, that a debtor’s debt obligation “is not
extinguished by the expiration of the statute of limitations, even though the debt
is ultimately unenforceable in a court of law”); Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau
Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[A] statute of limitations does not
eliminate the debt; it merely limits the judicial remedies available.”); Buchanan,
776 F.3d at 396–97 (“Under Michigan law, as under the law of most states, a debt
remains a debt even after the statute of limitations has run on enforcing it in
court.”); De Vries v. Alger, 44 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Mich. 1950) (“The running of the
statute of limitations does not cancel the debt, it merely prevents a creditor from
enforcing his claim.”); Walker v. Cash Flow Consultants, Inc., 200 F.R.D. 613, 616
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (recognizing that “Illinois law [provides that] the statute of
limitations bars a specific remedy; it does not extinguish the indebtedness”);
Ingram v. Earthman, 993 S.W.2d 611, 634 n.19 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), abrogated
on other grounds by Fahrner v. SW Mfg., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 141 (Tenn. 2001), as
recognized by Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d
436, 461 n.25 (Tenn. 2012) (“A statute of limitations bars the remedy only; it does
not undermine the substance of the plaintiff’s claim or cause of action.”); Shorty
v. Capital One Bank, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (D.N.M. 2000) (recognizing that
“New Mexico courts have held that statutes of limitations are procedural in
nature and merely bar judicial remedies by which a party seeks to enforce his or
her substantive rights”); Webster v. Kowal, 476 N.E.2d 205, 209 (Mass. 1985)
(recognizing that “[d]ebts barred by the statute of limitations . . . are not void but
are merely unenforceable”).
49. See, e.g., Huertas, 641 F.3d at 32–33 (noting that “it is appropriate for a
debt collector to request voluntary repayment of a time-barred debt”);
Freyermuth, 248 F.3d at 771 (finding an attempt to collect on a time-barred debt
permissible under the FDCPA because “a statute of limitations does not eliminate
the debt”); McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1020 (clarifying that it is not “automatically
improper for a debt collector to seek re-payment of time-barred debts,” as long as
it conforms with the FDCPA, and noting that “some people might consider full
debt re-payment a moral obligation, even though the legal remedy for the debt
has been extinguished”); Gervais v. Riddle & Assocs., P.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 270,
273 (D. Conn. 2007) (“Since the running of the statute of limitations does not
extinguish a debt, courts have permitted debt collectors to send collection letters
for time-barred debt where the letters do not threaten collection action.” (quoting
Wallace v. Capital One Bank, No. CIV. JFM–00–2290, 2001 WL 357301, at *2 (D.
Md. Apr. 6, 2001))); Johnson v. Capital One Bank, No. CIV. A. SA00CA315EP,
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Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in Buchanan v.
Northland Group, Inc.50:
Legal defenses [such as a statute of limitations defense] are not
moral defenses . . . [a]nd a creditor remains free, in the absence
of a bankruptcy order or something comparable preventing it
from trying to collect the debt, to let the debtor know what the
debt is and to ask her to pay it. There thus is nothing wrong
with informing debtors that a debt remains unpaid or for that
matter allowing them to satisfy the debt at a discount.51

According to Sixth Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge, who
dissented in Buchanan, a debtor who receives an offer to settle a
time-barred debt has no legitimate basis to complain of unfair
collection practices, for the simple reason that the debtor continues
to have “a legal obligation to pay her debt, even though the
obligation is no longer enforceable in court.”52 In Judge Kethledge’s
view, the debtor “did, after all, receive goods or services that she
did not pay for,” such that the collector “undisputedly would have
been within its rights simply to demand that she pay all the money
she owes.”53 As such, attempting to collect an old debt outside of
court is not inherently unlawful.
In the typical case, a collector will attempt to collect a
time-barred debt through written communications, which will
often include a formal offer to settle the debt.54 When a debtor
2000 WL 1279661, at *2 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2000) (“[A] statute of limitations bar
applies only to judicial remedies; it does not eliminate the debt. Creditors are
entitled to attempt to pursue even time-barred debts, so long as they comply with
the rules of the FDCPA.”); Johns v. Northland Grp., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 590, 595
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (recognizing that a collector is “still permitted to seek voluntary
repayment of [a time-barred] debt”).
50. 776 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2015).
51. Id. at 397; see also id. at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting that the
plaintiff, appellate courts judges, district court, and amici agencies, all agree that
the debt collector in the case would have been within its lawful rights to send the
debtor a letter that simply recited the amount of her debt and demanded payment
in full).
52. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 401 (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
53. Id.
54. Written communications, but not settlement offers, are required by the
FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692g (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-61) (stating
that a debt collector must follow up within five days of the initial communication).
In the letter, the collection must include basic information about the debt,
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receives an offer to settle a time-barred debt, her first option is to
simply fully pay the offered settlement amount, which is typically
10%–40% of the total outstanding debt.55 Debtors—particularly
unsophisticated ones who are unaware of the complex laws
governing this issue—may elect this option, even though the debt
at issue is not legally enforceable, simply to avoid harassment,
litigation, or adverse credit consequences.56
Letters containing such settlement offers typically notify the
debtor that paying the offered settlement amount will satisfy the
debt and close the account. In Buchanan, for example, debtor
Esther Buchanan received a collections letter from third-party
collector Northland Group, Inc., on a time-barred debt owned by
debt buyer, LVNV.57 Northland’s letter to Buchanan indicated a
“past due account balance” of $4,768.43, and offered to settle her
debt for $1,668.96.58 The letter stated that LVNV “is willing to
reduce your balance by offering you a settlement,” adding that
upon receipt of $1,668.96, “your account will be satisfied and closed
and a settlement letter will be issued.”59
including, among other things, the amount of the debt, the name of the creditor,
and various notices. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(1)–(5) (detailing the required contents
of the debt collector’s communication). In July 2016, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued an “Outline of Proposal Under Consideration
and Alternatives Considered,” which sets forth proposed rules relating to debt
collection and debt buying. Among other things, the CFPB Outline proposes that
collectors should be obligated to provide additional information, beyond what is
currently required by the FDCPA, to assist consumers in identifying the debt at
issue. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at app. F; see also Eric P.
Rosenkoetter & Keith Wier, The CFPB’s Outline of Debt Collection Proposals: A
Look
into
the
Past
and
Future,
BUS.
L.
TODAY,
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/10/03_ wier.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2017) (summarizing the proposals) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
55. See supra text accompanying note 45 (providing examples of a debtor
settling for 30% and 40% of the total outstanding debt).
56. See Stepney v. Outsourcing Sols., Inc., No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997) (“Unsophisticated consumers may pay amounts not
legally owed to avoid harassment or adverse credit consequences.”); see also Sobol,
supra note 5, at 350–51 (“Similarly, consumers may agree to pay unenforceable
debts in order to clean their credit reports.”).
57. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 395.
58. See id. (stating that unless the debtor disputed the debt within 30 days
of receipt of the letter, the third-party creditor assumed the debt was valid).
59. Id. In this scenario where a debtor’s obligation to repay a debt is settled
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Upon review of the Buchanan letter, both the trial and
appellate courts agreed that there was “nothing wrong” with
simply informing Buchanan that her debt remains unpaid and
“allowing [her] to satisfy the debt at a discount”60—in other words,
by asking for and receiving payment of the offered settlement
amount in satisfaction of the debt.61 Far more problematic is the
scenario where the debtor pays only a portion of the offered
settlement amount and, in the process, unwittingly revives the
statute of limitations as to the entire debt, one the collection
industry refers to as “duping” the debtor.62
III. Option 2: Partial Payments that Revive the Statute of
Limitations
As original creditors sell their debts to other creditors or debt
buyers, who often then resell debts to similar entities, the debts
inevitably get older.63 Many states have statutes of limitations
barring suits to collect on a debt after a certain period, typically
between three and six years from the last payment received on a
for less than the amount owed, the debtor may have to include the amount of debt
discharged as taxable income. See generally Bross v. C.I.R., No. 11959-10S, 2012
WL 6698659 (T.C. Dec. 26, 2012) (involving a taxpayer’s agreement with a credit
card company where, in return for a partial payment, the credit card company
canceled the unpaid balance of the credit card account).
60. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015); see
also id. at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (stating Buchanan was offered a
discount of thirty-five cents on the dollar to repay outstanding debt).
61. See generally United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (“A debtor,
in theory, and often in actuality, may adjust his debts by negotiated agreement
with his creditors.”).
62. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 349, n.155 (“Given the impact of the
acknowledgement on a time-barred debt, a collector may attempt to get the
consumer to recognize the existence of a debt without disclosing that the
limitation period has run.”); see also Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 401 (Kethledge, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing the “equitable point” raised by the majority that if debtor
sends creditor less than the settlement amount, then under many states’ laws,
the limitations period renews and the debt becomes legally enforceable again, and
conceding that “[v]irtually no one, save the creditors themselves, would welcome
that result”).
63. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 42 (noting
that as debts are sold they inevitably get older).
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credit card,64 which represents a large portion of consumer debt.65
However, savvy debt collectors can avoid the statute of limitations
through little known and counterintuitive rules regarding debt
acknowledgment.66
Statutes of limitations originated in 1623 in England.67 As
courts have long recognized, statutes of limitations are not mere
“technicalities,” but instead are “fundamental to a well-ordered
judicial system.”68 Such statutes serve various purposes. They
reflect the “legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the
adversary on notice to defend within a specified period of time and
that ‘the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail
over the right to prosecute them.’”69 They are also designed to
“protect defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases
in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss
64. Statutes of limitations set a maximum time after a cause of action
accrues in which a plaintiff may file suit. In the usual case, accrual occurs when
the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief, such as when an injury was incurred
or discovered. See CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 2182 (2014)
(explaining statutes of limitations and when they accrue). For a credit card debt,
the debt owner’s cause of action accrues when the debtor made his or her last
payment on the account. See Knighten v. Palisades Collections, LLC, 721 F. Supp.
2d 1261, 1269 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (stating that credit card debt collection actions
have a four-year statute of limitations in Florida); McCollough v. Johnson,
Rodenberg & Lauinger, 587 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1176 (D. Mont. 2008) (stating that
credit card debt collection actions have a five-year statute of limitations in
Montana), aff’d sub nom. McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC,
637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011); Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLS, No. 07 C 410, 2008
WL 94798, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2008) (noting that the statute of limitations
period on a credit card debt in Illinois “commences with either the charge off date
or the last date of payment,” and finding accrual based on the date of the last
payment, which was more recent).
65. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 42
(discussing common statutes of limitations for debt collection actions); see also
Lauren Goldberg, Note, Dealing in Debt: The High Stakes World of Debt Collection
After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 711, 750 (2006) (noting that debtors face
frustration in dealing with creditor attempts to collect time-barred debts).
66. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 750–51 (discussing the effect of debt
acknowledgment).
67. See Hart v. Deshong, 8 A.2d 85, 86 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (discussing the
history of statutes of limitations).
68. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980).
69. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting R.R.
Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
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of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses,
fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.”70
Given the policies underlying statutes of limitations, many
courts have held that a debt collector violates the FDCPA by filing
suit to collect a debt that appears to be time-barred.71 Collectors
have found at least two ways around this restriction. First, because
most debtors do not defend suits on time-barred debts and
consequently do not raise the statute of limitations defense, some
collectors still file such suits hoping the debtor will not defend, a
scenario that almost always leads to a default judgment against
the debtor.72 Second, and more troubling, a debt collector can
sidestep the FDCPA prohibition against suing on a time-barred
debt, as well as the possibility of having a collection suit dismissed
as untimely, by taking advantage of laws that reset the time to sue
on an old debt.73
A. The Partial Payment Rule
Even if the statute of limitations on a debt has run, courts
generally agree that a debtor’s unqualified acknowledgment of a
debt implies a new promise to pay it, even if the debtor does not
expressly promise to do so, thereby restarting the statute of
limitations on the debt.74 This rule rests on the notion that the
running of the statute of limitations merely “suspends” the ability
to enforce the debt in court and does not discharge the underlying
70. Id.; see also Gillingham v. Brown, 60 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1901)
(explaining the value and history of statutes of limitations).
71. See infra notes 135–150 and accompanying text (discussing penalties for
debt collectors who try to collect time-barred debts).
72. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 745 (“Defendants often
default . . . because they fail to understand the complaint or because they concede
defeat, unaware of possible defenses.”) (quotation omitted).
73. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 750–51 (noting that some states restart
the statute of limitations when a debtor acknowledges a time-barred debt).
74. See 31 Williston on Contracts § 79:77 (4th ed.) (noting doctrine is “well
settled in most jurisdictions”); see also Hart, 8 A.2d at 87 (discussing English
common law authorities on the acknowledgment rule and concluding that an
acknowledgment of an existing debt “must be ‘unqualified and unconditional’ in
order to imply a promise to pay and thus remove the bar of the Statute [of
Limitations]”).
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debt itself, and reflects the “valid public policy to encourage
debtors to make payments on obligations that are due but the
collection of which is barred by a limitations period.”75 For these
reasons, once a debt is acknowledged or a new promise to pay the
debt is made, the statute of limitations bar is removed and the
ability to enforce the debt is restored.76
In most jurisdictions, a debt can be acknowledged either
through an express acknowledgment, which should generally be
made in writing,77 or through a payment on the debt.78 Thus, a
debtor who makes a $10 payment on a $3,000 time-barred debt will
revive the statute of limitations as to the entire balance, allowing
suit to recover that amount for years to come. As one Delaware
court noted, “[t]he acknowledgment, written or oral, is an
admission by word; the part payment is an admission by fact.”79
Although different in form, in both types of admissions, “the law

75. O’Malley v. Frazier, 49 P.3d 438, 444 (Kan. 2002).
76. See DRFP L.L.C. v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, 151 F. Supp. 3d
809, 825 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (examining the common law history of the
acknowledgment of a debt rule).
77. See, e.g., Nesbit v. Galleher, 5 S.E.2d 501, 503 (Va. 1939) (finding debtor’s
letter in response to a request for payment of a legal fee she incurred, which stated
that she did not have the money at that time to pay the debt, constituted a new
promise in writing sufficient to overcome the statute of limitations defense). State
statutes sometimes impose the requirement of a written acknowledgment, but
such statutory requirements do not alter the partial payment rule. See, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. § 25-216 (2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-36 (2017) (stating that debt
acknowledgments must be made in writing).
78. See, e.g., Keota Mills & Elevator v. Gamble, 243 P.3d 1156, 1159 (Okla.
2010) (recognizing that since 1910, the general rule in Oklahoma is that a partial
payment on a debt extends or revives the applicable statute of limitations on the
debt) (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 101); O’Malley v. Frazier, 49 P.3d 438, 443–44
(Kan. 2002) (recognizing that under Kansas law, partial payment on a debt serves
as a voluntary acknowledgment which implies a new promise to pay the debt);
Hickerson v. Vessels, 316 P.3d 620, 625 (Colo. 2014) (recognizing that Colorado’s
partial payment doctrine “has been part of our common law jurisprudence since
at least 1883” and that, “under this doctrine, where a debtor voluntarily makes a
payment, the payment constitutes a promise to pay the remaining debt and
operates to restart the statute of limitations period”); Pear v. Grand Forks Motel
Assoc., 553 N.W.2d 774, 782–83 (N.D. 1996) (recognizing that under North
Dakota law, any payment of principal or interest on a debt renews the statute of
limitations on the entire debt).
79. Hart v. Deshong, 8 A.2d 85, 87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939).
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implies a promise to pay,” thereby lifting the statute of limitations
bar.80
Importantly, courts have cautioned that a partial payment on
a debt does not automatically revive the statute of limitations, as
the payment must involve circumstances from which the law will
imply a clear promise to pay the entire debt.81 In one such case,
Roth v. Michelson,82 the Court of Appeals of New York considered
whether a debtor’s payment in 1973 toward a mortgage he
assumed in 1960, and for which he had made only one previous
payment twelve years earlier, was sufficient to revive the creditor’s
cause of action against the debtor.83 Finding that it was, the court
noted that the debtor’s check contained the legend, “payment
against mortgage, 14 Hamilton Avenue” (the address of the
mortgaged premises), and was accompanied by a note stating that
it is “my hope for the future and my determination to make good
ALL of my debts, particularly my debt to you two.”84 Under these
circumstances, the promise to pay the entire debt was inferred, and
the plaintiff’s cause of action against the debtor was revived.85
In other cases, courts have refused to apply the partial
payment rule where a debtor imposes strict conditions on
repayment. In Gillingham v. Brown,86 for example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that where a partial
payment is made conditioned on paying the balance by
80. Id.
81. See id. (“In each case when the acknowledgment or part payment is
direct and unconditional and the surrounding circumstances are such that the
law implies a promise to pay, then the bar of the Statute [of Limitations] is
lifted.”); see also Gillingham v. Brown, 60 N.E. 122, 123 (Mass. 1901) (examining
English authorities and concluding that “if [an alleged] acknowledgment be
accompanied by circumstances, or words which repel the idea of an intention to
pay, no promise can be implied”); Hart, 8 A.2d at 87 (noting acknowledgment of
existing debt “must be ‘unqualified and unconditional’ in order to imply a promise
to pay,” “an acknowledgment . . . which expressly negatives the promise to pay
has no effect,” and “[w]hen a promise to pay cannot be plainly drawn from all the
surrounding circumstances the acknowledgment is ineffective”).
82. 55 N.Y.2d 278 (1982).
83. Id. at 280.
84. Id. at 282 (emphasis in original).
85. See id. at 282–83 (explaining that the defendant’s statements and
payment were sufficient to renew the statute of limitations).
86. 60 N.E. 122 (Mass. 1901).
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installments, the plaintiff’s only remedy was to recover the
installments as they became due (rather than the full amount of
the debt).87 In another case, Markiewicz v. Toton,88 the same court
considered whether a $40 payment the defendant made on his debt
of $1,824.80 was intended to be an unconditional promise to pay
the full balance, or whether the defendant had conditioned the
payment upon paying only $5 or $10 a week, if he had the money.89
Finding questions of fact on that issue, the appellate court reversed
the trial court’s application of the partial payment rule and ordered
a new trial in the case.90
Gillingham and Markiewicz each involved evidence that the
debtor’s payment did not reflect a clear promise to pay the entire
debt. These cases indicate that a waiver of the statute of
limitations “must be taken as it is,” either “absolute, if absolute,”
or “conditional, if conditional.”91 However, the debtor’s intent is not
always easy to decipher.
In cases where there is no evidence regarding the debtor’s
intent, courts will often apply the partial payment rule in its
absolute form.92 Thus, a partial payment will be considered an
acknowledgment of the entire debt “in the absence . . . of anything
to the contrary,” thereby implying a promise to pay the entire
amount.93 This is particularly true in the case of credit card debt,94
allowing collectors to use the rule to easily avoid the statute of
limitations bar.

87. See id. at 124 (finding that conditional waivers cannot also be absolute).
88. 198 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1935).
89. See id. at 659–60 (stating the facts and issue of the case).
90. See id. at 660–61 (reversing and ordering a new trial).
91. Gillingham, 60 N.E. at 124.
92. See Nutter v. Mroczka, 21 N.E.2d 979, 983 (Mass. 1939) (“But in the
absence, as here, of anything to the contrary such a part payment is an
acknowledgment of the obligation and implies a promise of payment thereof
which interrupts the running of the statute.”).
93. Id.
94. See Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Hottenroth, 26 N.E.3d 269, 276 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2014) (“Typically, the making of a partial payment on [a credit card account]
before the statute of limitations expires extends the implied promise to pay the
balance owed amount, acting to renew the statute of limitations period.” (citing
Himelfarb v. Am. Express Co., 484 A.2d 1013 (Md. 1984))).
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B. Debt Collector Use of the Partial Payment Rule

When a debtor receives an offer to settle a time-barred debt, a
debtor who wishes to pay off the debt, but cannot afford to pay the
full settlement amount at that time, often makes a small payment
as an installment. In states like Massachusetts, where a partial
payment serves as an acknowledgment of the debt given no
evidence to the contrary, such a payment revives the statute of
limitations on the debt and makes the debtor liable for the entire
amount.95
Because the average debtor is almost certainly unaware of the
partial payment rule,96 courts have routinely lamented this
result.97 Making matters worse, in their written settlement offers,
collectors usually fail to convey that a debt is time-barred and that
a partial payment on the debt, however small, will revive the
statute of limitations on the debt and permit recovery of the entire
balance.98 Some collectors go one step further, deliberately
95. See Nutter, 21 N.E.2d at 983 (discussing when a partial payment revives
the statute of limitations).
96. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 19 (“Concepts related
to statutes of limitations are challenging for consumers to understand, especially
the fact that in some jurisdictions consumers may ‘revive’ a debt and reset the
statute of limitations by making a partial payment or acknowledging the debt in
writing.”).
97. In Buchanan, for example, dissenting Judge Kethledge declared:
There remains, as the majority points out, an equitable point—that if
a debtor sends a creditor less than the settlement amount, then under
Michigan law (and that of many states) the limitations period runs
anew and the debt becomes enforceable again in court. Virtually no
one, save the creditors themselves, would welcome that result.
Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2015)
(Kethledge, J., dissenting).
98. Proposed Rules, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 78 FR 67876
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006); see, e.g., Buchanan,
776 F.3d at 395–96 (examining an offer to settle a time-barred debt where the
collection letter failed to mention that the state’s statute of limitations had run
on the debt or that a partial payment on a time-barred debt restarts the statute
of limitations); Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 510 (5th
Cir. 2016) (same); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020–22 (7th
Cir. 2014) (considering two cases that involved a collection letter offering to settle
a time-barred debt without notifying the debtor that the applicable statute of
limitations on the debt had expired or that a partial payment may make the
debtor vulnerable to a suit on the full amount of the debt).
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attempting to “dupe” consumers into acknowledging a debt
through collection techniques such as detachable return stubs in
demand letters that offer debtors different payment options on a
debt.99
To combat these deceptive tactics, some states, including
North Carolina, have enacted statutes making it unlawful for a
debt collector to seek a written acknowledgment of any
time-barred debt without disclosing the consequences of an
acknowledgment.100 Although such warnings are a step in the right
direction, statutes like the North Carolina statute simply set forth
requirements for written acknowledgments and do not alter the
rules relating to acknowledgments accomplished via partial
payment.101 As such, even in states that seek to ensure that
acknowledgments are intelligently made, greater protections are
needed.
IV. Option 3: No Response by Debtor, Leading to Collector Suits
Against Debtors
A. The Prevalence of Default Judgments Against Debtors

99. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 349 (“One such technique is to include
detachable return stubs in demand letters . . . . When a consumer returns the
stub even without any payment, the consumer may have acknowledged the
debt . . . .”) (citing Richard Rubin, FDCPA Claims Arising Out of State Court
Collection Litigation, CONSUMER ADVOC., Sept. 2008, at 19).
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-70-115(1) (2017) (barring debt collectors from
seeking acknowledgments without disclosing the consequences of doing so); see
also Jenkins v. RJM Acquisitions, LLC, No. 5:10CV27-RLV, 2013 WL 589006, at
*5 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 14, 2013) (recognizing that “§ 58–70–115(1) was meant to keep
collection agencies from luring unsuspecting consumers into reviving the expired
statute of limitations by obtaining written acknowledgments of time-barred
debts”).
101. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-26 (“No acknowledgment or promise is evidence
of a new or continuing contract, from which the statutes of limitations run, unless
it is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this
section does not alter the effect of any payment of principal or interest.”); see also
Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 122 S.E. 377, 378 (N.C. 1924) (recognizing that the North
Carolina statute requiring acknowledgments to be in writing “does not restrict or
modify in any way the effect of a payment under the general principles prevailing
in this jurisdiction when the statute was enacted”).

470

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 (2018)

Most debt collection litigation occurs in state court.102
Hundreds and sometimes thousands of third-party debt collection
cases are filed in any given county every year, representing a
significant percentage of a state court’s docket.103 A 2010 New York
Times article, for example, reported that in 2009, about 96,000
consumer debt collection cases were filed in California’s Alameda,
Contra Costa, and San Francisco Counties alone, a significant
increase from the 53,665 cases filed in 2007.104 This trend is not
limited to California. The FTC has concluded, for example, that
“[t]he majority of cases on many state court dockets on a given day
often are debt collection matters.”105 The sheer number106 and
complexity107 of debt collection cases has overwhelmed some
courts, providing a natural incentive for courts to grant default

102. Proposed Rules, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 78 FR 67848
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006). Some debt collection
litigation occurs in federal court and some occurs in small claims court. See Fox,
supra note 2, at 356–57 (reporting that national debt collection firms often engage
in forum shopping in Indiana by filing low-dollar debt collection actions in Circuit
Court rather than small claims court).
103. See William Joseph Bearden, Employing the Prima Facie Standard in
Third Party Debt Collection Default Judgments, 48 URB. LAW. 365, 366 (2016)
(“These cases usually account for a significant percentage of cases within any
given jurisdiction . . . .”).
104. Yeung, supra note 30.
105. CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 18.
106. See Duffy, supra note 1, at 1148 (reporting that, “[s]ince the mid-2000s,
the Civil Court of the City of New York has been overwhelmed by debt collection
lawsuits,” and noting that between 2006 and 2008, debt collectors filed
approximately 300,000 lawsuits per year in New York); Yeung, supra note 30
(reporting the opinion of Fred W. Schwinn of the Consumer Law Center that
“[c]reditors and debt buyers are swamping the California court system with
debt-collection cases”).
107. When debtors do defend, the burden on the judiciary is compounded, not
only by the complexity of some debt collection cases, such as those involving the
circuit split described in Part V below, but also by the fact that even
run-of-the-mill suits can quickly become complex. As one court stated in a recent
debt collection action: “Despite starting from the deceptively simple origins of an
action arising from a consumer debt, this case became unduly complicated, in part
brought upon by the parties’ inability to accurately set forth the facts as presented
in the documentary evidence.” Midland Funding, L.L.C. v. Hottenroth, 26 N.E.3d
269, 274 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
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judgments when possible simply to clear cases from their
dockets.108
The protection that statutes of limitations provide to
consumers is not automatic. Instead, the running of the statute of
limitations is an affirmative defense that consumers must raise
before courts will dismiss a collection suit.109 However, 70% to 95%
of consumers sued in debt collection actions do not defend such
suits, likely because they lack the financial ability to do so, and
therefore never assert the statute of limitations defense.110
Moreover, because the defense is waived unless asserted, courts do
not require a plaintiff to prove a debt is not time-barred where the
defendant does not raise the defense. As a result, suits on
time-barred debts often result in default judgments being awarded
against debtors, perhaps in as many as 90% of such cases, even
108. For the federal courts, the Civil Justice Reform Act requires semiannual
reports, available to the public, that disclose for each federal judge “(1) the
number of motions on the judge’s docket that have been pending for more than
six months; (2) the number of bench trials that have been submitted for more than
six months; and (3) the number of cases that have not been terminated within
three years after filing.” 28 U.S.C. § 476 (1990). This reporting requirement
creates a natural incentive for judges to clear cases from their dockets,
particularly those that are easily resolved (as with default judgments). See R.
Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look,
Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687, 702–03 (1993) (summarizing judicial
attitudes indicating how CJRA reporting requirements provide incentives for
judges to dispose of cases more quickly).
109. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 202 (2006) (“Ordinarily in civil
litigation, a statutory time limitation is forfeited if not raised in a defendant’s
answer or in an amendment thereto.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c), 12(b), 15(a)
(laying out how defendants must assert the running of a statute of limitations).
110. See FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at 45
(reporting that “90% or more of consumers sued in [debt collection] actions do not
appear in court to defend”); Duffy, supra note 1, at 1148 n.2 (reporting that in
2011, 134,423 consumer cases were filed in the Civil Court of the City of New
York, and that of these cases, 107,618 went unanswered, 70,371 resulted in
default judgments, and attorneys represented consumer defendants in only 3,342
cases); Yeung, supra note 30 (“According to debt-collection industry estimates,
between 75 and 80 percent of debtors in these cases do not respond to their
lawsuits, and 95 percent of these result in default judgments.”); Mary Spector,
Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on
Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 288, 296 (2011) (reporting on
the low numbers of defendants who appear for debt collection cases; nearly 80%
of defendants do not defend suits, and nearly 40% of cases result in a default
judgment).
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though most debtors could have the case dismissed through
minimal litigation efforts.111 With the addition of interest,
litigation costs, and attorney’s fees, the result can be a judgment
against the debtor of more than 300% of the amount originally
owed.112 Thereafter, “post-judgment remedies may include
property seizure, residential liens, and wage garnishment.”113
B. Default Judgments Against Debtors: The Root Causes
According to professor Victoria Haneman, “[b]ringing a
lawsuit on [a time-barred] debt is . . . nothing but bluffing,” which,
although perhaps acceptable between attorneys, is simply
“unsporting and coercive” against unrepresented laypersons.114
Nevertheless, such suits regularly occur, and often result in
default judgments against debtors.115 There are at least three root
causes for this: aggressive litigation practices by debt owners and
collectors, overly-relaxed judicial standards in default cases, and
professional ethics rules that encourage rather than prevent such
suits.116
To take advantage of the prevalence of default judgments on
time-barred debts, debt buyers often maintain a network of
attorneys through whom default judgments are sought.117 Even
111. See Roth v. Michelson, 55 N.Y.2d 278, 280–82 (N.Y. 1982) (explaining
that payment on a time-barred debt can restart the statute of limitations); see
also Haneman, supra note 7, at 722 (reporting that “[d]efault is by far the most
common action [in suits involving time-barred debts], occurring in 70% to 90% of
all cases”).
112. Haneman, supra note 7, at 717.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 709.
115. See id. at 709–10 (“The result, most often, is a judgment against the
consumer debtor who typically defaults or, less typically, appears pro se but
without the knowledge or skill to use the statute effectively within the narrow
‘raise it or waive it’ time.”).
116. See id. at 707 (“The professional ethics of the American bar overtly
permit attorneys to knowingly exploit the ignorance and inexperience of
unrepresented litigants.”).
117. See id. at 716 (“Debt-buyers are relying more heavily upon legal actions
than ever before, often maintaining nationwide networks of attorneys to whom
accounts are referred and by whom lawsuits are filed and remedies pursued.”).
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without the evidence needed to secure judgment, these attorneys
bring extremely large numbers of such suits knowing they will only
need to provide account records in the few cases, about 10%, where
the defendant actually appears.118 Although most cases end in
default judgment due to debtors failing to defend, in cases where a
defense is mounted, the collector’s usual response is to simply
dismiss the suit.119
Based on these practices, some law firms have been deemed
debt collection “litigation mills,” filing tens of thousands of debt
collection suits every year with minimal attorney involvement and
very little documentation on individual accounts.120 One such law
firm, for example, filed over 350,000 lawsuits in Georgia from 2009
to 2013 to recover on allegedly defaulted debt.121 Another law firm
filed nearly 3,000 such lawsuits in Montana alone from January
2007 to July 2008.122
Once suit is filed, existing procedural rules governing default
judgments make it likely that collector suits on time-barred debts
will receive little attention and thus simply fall through the
judicial cracks. Having served as a judicial clerk for several years,
where I worked on numerous cases resulting in default judgments
against defendants who failed to defend, there can be no doubt
118. See Bearden, supra note 103, at 372–74 (“Since 90% of defendants in
these cases typically do not appear . . . . [Plaintiffs’ attorneys] know that a large
percentage of . . . debtors will default in court.”); see also Edward J. Halper &
Rachel L. Schaller, Credit Card Collection Suits: Life Preservers for Illinois
Consumers, 100 ILL. B.J. 360, 386 (2012) (“The debt collection industry does not
want to incur substantial time and expense in proving its case—even if it can.”).
119. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J. Hanna & Assocs., P.C.,
114 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1348–50 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (describing one law firm’s debt
collection litigation practices).
120. See id. at 1366 (describing “litigation mills” as law firms with very little
attorney involvement in each case).
121. See id. at 1349 (involving a creditors’ rights law firm that filed over
350,000 lawsuits in Georgia from 2009 to 2013 to recover on allegedly defaulted
debt).
122. See McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939,
945, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the firm filed 2,700 collection actions in
Montana from January 2007 to July 2008 and that approximately 90% of the
firm’s case filings result in default judgment, and describing testimony regarding
one Montana law firm’s “factory” approach of “mass producing default judgments”
in debt collection actions).
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that courts take a more relaxed approach when ruling on motions
for default judgment (as compared to a contested motion for
summary judgment, for example). Indeed, current rules of
procedure, such as Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, all but require such treatment.123 According to one
commentator, judicial practices in debt collection litigation “often
result in a practical presumption that the plaintiff has a right to
collect, often without even providing any evidence that the debt
is valid and the plaintiff is the legitimate holder of the debt.”124
Such relaxed judicial standards only exacerbate the bad habits of
debt buyers and their attorneys,125 such as inadequate account
documentation and poor case preparation.126
Along with aggressive attorney tactics and relaxed judicial
standards, legal ethics rules are partly to blame for collector suits
on time-barred debts. In most states, attorneys are governed by
rules of ethics that are based on the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.127 In a 1994 formal opinion interpreting the
ABA Model Rules, the ABA Ethics Committee determined that
filing suit on a time-barred debt is generally not unethical.
Considering both a lawyer’s duty not to file a “frivolous” lawsuit
under Rule 3.1 and the lawyer’s duty of candor toward the tribunal
set forth in Rule 3.3, the opinion concludes that “it is generally not

123. See infra Part VII.D (proposing that the burden of proof for statutes of
limitation be flipped to the plaintiff in debt collection cases); see also FED. R. CIV.
P. 55 (providing rules for default judgments).
124. Bearden, supra note 103, at 372; see also In re Assigned Consumer Debt
Default Judgment Applications., Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-141546, 56-CV-14-1644, 56-CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-142663, 2015 WL 1087512, at *3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 6, 2015) (stating that, before
a Minnesota statute was enacted to tighten the standards for awarding default
judgments in consumer debt suits, the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office
encountered cases where plaintiffs faced serious injustices).
125. See Bearden, supra note 103, at 372 (“This nearly complete absence of
any burden of proof on plaintiff[s] has allowed practices to flourish in the debt
buying industry that may support a lackadaisical approach to litigation . . . .”).
126. See id. at 372–73 (explaining why plaintiffs often lack information in
debt collection actions).
127. See Haneman, supra note 7, at 727 (“Some version of the ABA Model
Rules has been adopted by forty-four states and the District of Columbia.”).
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a violation of either of these rules to file a time-barred lawsuit, so
long as this does not violate the law of the relevant jurisdiction.”128
Underlying this opinion is the notion that affirmative
defenses, such as the running of the statute of limitations, are
waived unless asserted,129 coupled with the assumption of the
American adversarial system that justice will prevail when
roughly equal advocates on both sides of a dispute advocate
zealously on behalf of their clients.130 Because so many debtors fail
to defend suits on time-barred debts, however, this assumption
simply does not apply here, creating a systemic flaw available to
those willing to exploit it.131
Whether through attorney self-regulation, changes to rules of
ethics, or statutory reforms, collectors should not be allowed to use
the courts to convert old debts into enforceable judgments that far
exceed the amount of the original debt. Accordingly, reforms are
necessary to reduce the number of default judgments in suits
involving time-barred debts.

128. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Disclosure to Opposing
Party and Court that Statute of Limitations Has Run, ABA Formal Op. 94-387
(1994).
129. See id. (recognizing that “[t]he result under Rules 3.1 and 3.3 might well
be different if the limitations defect in the claim were jurisdictional, and thus
affected the court’s power to adjudicate the suit”).
130. See Haneman, supra note 7, at 728 (“To understand the philosophical
foundations that support the ABA’s long held position requires looking no further
than the influence of the premises of adversarial justice on the codes of
professional conduct.”).
131. The possibility of default judgments being awarded against a debtor
defendant due to a failure to defend, despite the availability of a winning defense,
is not limited to the statute of limitations defense. Professor Mary Spector, for
example, has reported that in 38 of 507 cases initiated by debt buyers against
consumers to collect delinquent credit card debt in Dallas County, Texas, the
plaintiff failed to comply with Texas law requiring debt collectors to file a bond
and did not have active bonds on file for the calendar year at issue, which violated
Texas state law. Spector, supra note 110, at 280. Yet, not one defendant in the 38
cases she examined actually raised those claims, and only two defendants even
appeared. Id. at 281. Moreover, because her study involved a limited sample of
cases, Professor Spector estimates that unbonded debt buyers filed about 1,200
cases during 2007 in Dallas County Courts-at-Law alone. Id. at 280–81. Had any
of the plaintiffs raised the issue, they might have been able to avoid the suits
altogether or even obtain statutory damages for the debt collectors’ conduct. Id.
at 281.
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V. Option 4: Debtor Suits Against Collectors for FDCPA
Violations

The FDCPA is enforced through both administrative action
and private lawsuits. Although administrative enforcement has
been extensive,132 with respect to private suits, which is the focus
of this Article, the FDCPA makes debt collectors who fail to comply
with the statute liable to the individuals affected.133 Successful
plaintiffs are entitled to “actual damage[s],” plus costs and “a
reasonable attorney’s fee as determined by the court.”134 A court
may also award “additional damages,” subject to a statutory cap of

132. On the administrative side, violations of the FDCPA are deemed to be
unfair or deceptive acts or practices under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 41, et seq. (2012), and are enforced by the Federal Trade Commission.
See Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573, 576
(2010) (stating that a debt collector can avoid liability for violation of the FDCPA
if “she can show ‘the violation was not intentional and resulted from a[n] . . . error
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such
error’”); 15 U.S.C. § 1692l (authorizing the FTC to enforce violations of the
FDCPA). Under this framework, a debt collector may face penalties of up to
$10,000 per day for acting with “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on
the basis of objective circumstances” that the collector’s act is prohibited under
the FDCPA. See Jerman, 559 U.S. at 573 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), (C)); 74
Fed. Reg. 858 (2009) (amending 16 CFR § 1.98(d)). A debt collector is not liable in
any action brought under the FDCPA, however, if it “shows by a preponderance
of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide
error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to
avoid any such error.” Jerman, 559 U.S. at 573 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c)).
Violations of the FDCPA are also enforced by the CFPB, which shares
enforcement responsibility with the FTC. See 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 3, at 7. Since the CFPB commenced operations in 2011, it has brought
more than twenty-five debt collection cases against first- and third-party
collectors alleging FDCPA violations or unfair, deceptive, and abusive debt
collection acts and practices in violation of the Dodd-Frank Act. In these cases,
the Bureau has ordered over $100 million in civil penalties, over $300 million in
restitution to consumers, and billions of dollars in debt relief to consumers.
During this same five-year period, the FTC has brought more than forty debt
collection cases alleging FDCPA violations or unfair or deceptive acts and
practices in violation of the FTC Act, and states have brought numerous
additional actions against debt collectors for violating state debt collection and
consumer protection laws. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 1.
133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a) (providing penalties for violators of the FDCPA,
including damages for persons affected by the violation).
134. Id. § 1692k(a)(1), (3).
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$1,000 for individual actions, or, for class actions, “the lesser of
$500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector.”135
In recent years, courts have examined whether a debtor may
assert an FDCPA claim for (1) actual suits brought by collectors
against debtors on time-barred debts, (2) threats to sue on such
debts (without actually filing suit), and (3) offers to settle such
debts (without any direct threat to sue). Courts generally agree
that the first two types of actions are prohibited by the FDCPA,
but are split on the lawfulness of a mere offer to settle a
time-barred debt in the absence of an explicit threat to sue, with
the recent trend being that such an act is indeed unlawful.136
A. Suits Against Debtors on Time-Barred Debts as Violations
of the FDCPA
The FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using “any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection
with the collection of any debt.”137 The statute contains a
non-exclusive list of unlawful practices, including falsely
representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any debt,”138
“threat[ening] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or
that is not intended to be taken,”139 and using “any . . . deceptive
means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”140 In addition, a
separate FDCPA provision prohibits collectors from using “unfair
or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any
135. Id. § 1692k(a)(2). In awarding additional damages, the court must
consider “the frequency and persistence of [the collector’s] noncompliance,” “the
nature of such noncompliance,” and “the extent to which such noncompliance was
intentional.” Id. § 1692k(b).
136. See Patrick Lunsford, A Settlement Offer on Time-Barred Debt May
Violate FDCPA Says Split Sixth Circuit, INSIDE ARM (Jan. 14, 2015, 7:29 AM)
https://www.insidearm.com/news/00040876-a-settlement-offer-on-time-barreddebt-ma/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2018) (discussing the Buchanan decision, which
found that an offer to settle on time-barred debt may violate the FDCPA, and
noting that this finding is in conflict with Third and Eighth Circuit decisions) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
138. Id. § 1692e(2)(a).
139. Id. § 1692e(5).
140. Id. § 1692e(10).
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debt.”141 A consumer only has to prove one violation to trigger
liability.142
To curtail collectors from suing on time-barred debts (likely
hoping to secure default judgments against debtors who fail to
defend), many courts have held that a debt collector violates the
FDCPA by filing suit on a debt that appears to be time-barred.143
141. Id. § 1692f.
142. Davis v. Trans Union, LLC, 526 F. Supp. 2d 577, 586 (W.D.N.C. 2007)
(“The FDCPA is a strict liability statute and a consumer only has to prove one
violation to trigger liability.” (citation and quotation omitted)). Because Congress
intended the FDCPA to have a “broad remedial scope,” Daugherty v. Convergent
Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 2016), courts normally interpret the
FDCPA broadly and in the consumer’s favor. Id. When evaluating whether a
collection letter violates the FDCPA, courts view the letter from the perspective
of an “unsophisticated or least sophisticated consumer,” and assume the debtor is
neither shrewd nor experienced in dealing with creditors. Id.; see also McMahon
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1019 (7th Cir. 2014) (viewing the letter
through the lens of “a person of modest education and limited commercial savvy”);
Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that
the FDCPA protects “all consumers,” from the “shrewd” to the “gullible,” “from
practices that would mislead the ‘reasonable unsophisticated consumer,’ one with
some level of understanding and one willing to read the document with some
care”); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175 (11th Cir. 1985)
(examining this issue at length and concluding that the FDCPA is designed to
protect the “least sophisticated consumers,” rather than “reasonable consumers”
who could more readily protect themselves in the market place).
143. See, e.g., Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala.
1987) (filing time-barred suit violated the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (2012));
Basile v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore LLC, 632 F. Supp. 2d 842, 845–
47 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (noting that “[c]ourts have held that the filing of a time-barred
lawsuit violates the FDCPA;” on the merits, finding that debt collector’s suit was
time-barred, but that a genuine factual issue existed regarding whether the
collector could assert the bona fide error defense); Knighten v. Palisades
Collections, LLC, 721 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that
lawyers violated the FDCPA by filing a time-barred suit for a party that lacked
standing, and rejecting lawyers’ attempt to invoke bona fide error defense),
clarified on denial of reconsideration, No. 09-CIV-20051, 2011 WL 835783 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 4, 2011); Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 07 C 410, 2008 WL
94798, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2008) (finding the FDCPA violated by the filing
of a lawsuit on a time-barred debt); Midland Funding, LLC v. Hottenroth, 26
N.E.3d 269, 275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014) (finding a violation of the FDCPA); see also
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Federal
circuit and district courts have uniformly held that a debt collector’s threatening
to sue on a time-barred debt and/or filing a time-barred suit in state court to
recover that debt violates §§ 1692e and 1692f.”); Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC
(In re Dubois), 834 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Federal courts have consistently
held that a debt collector violates the FDCPA by filing a lawsuit or threatening
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In a recent opinion, the Ohio Court of Appeals based this decision
on the FDCPA’s prohibition against falsely representing the
character or legal status of the debt. According to that court:
A debt collector violates [the FDCPA] by . . . falsely
representing “the character, amount, or legal status of any
debt.” Common sense dictates that whether a debt is
time-barred is directly related to the legal status of that debt.
As a result, a debt collector violates the FDCPA in filing a legal
action based on a time-barred debt.144

An alternative approach derives from Kimber v. Federal
Financial Corporation,145 which determined that filing suit on a
debt that appears to be time-barred is an unfair and
unconscionable means of collecting the debt under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f (2012).146 According to the Kimber court, “[b]ecause few
unsophisticated consumers would be aware that a statute of
limitations could be used to defend against lawsuits based on stale
debts, such consumers would unwittingly acquiesce to such
lawsuits.”147 In addition:
[E]ven if the consumer realizes that she can use time as a
defense, she will more than likely still give in rather than fight
the lawsuit because she must still expend energy and resources
and subject herself to the embarrassment of going into court to
present the defense; this is particularly true in light of the costs
of attorneys today.148

Rejecting the collector’s rather remarkable argument that its
attorney was ethically bound to file suit given the possibility that
the debtor would waive the statute of limitations defense by failing
to defend, the court relied on cases where sanctions have been
imposed under Rule 11 for filing suit “where the attorney knew or

to file a lawsuit to collect a time-barred debt.”).
144. Midland Funding, LLC, at 275 (internal marks and citations omitted).
145. 668 F. Supp. 1480 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
146. See id. 1487 (“[A] debt collector’s filing of a lawsuit on a debt that appears
to be time-barred, without the debt collector having first determined after a
reasonable inquiry that that limitations period has been or should be tolled, is an
unfair and unconscionable means of collecting the debt.”).
147. Id.
148. Id.
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should have known a claim was time-barred.”149 As another, more
recent case put it, to accept such an argument:
[W]ould permit a lawyer to pursue a claim against an
unsophisticated consumer on a debt that the consumer no
longer has a legal obligation to pay in the hopes that the
consumer’s inexperience and lack of expertise will cause him or
her to overlook the limitations bar and waive the right to assert
it. This is precisely the type of deceptive practice that the
FDCPA was designed to prohibit.150

As these courts recognize, because the viability of a suit on a
time-barred debt hinges entirely on suing an unsophisticated
debtor, the very type of debtor the FDCPA is designed to protect,
there is simply no merit to the argument that it is proper to file
such suits.151
In one particularly egregious case involving a law firm’s filing
suit against a debtor on a time-barred debt, McCollough v.
Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC,152 the plaintiff-debtor was
awarded the $1,000 statutory maximum for an FDCPA violation,
$250,000 for emotional distress, and $60,000 in punitive
damages.153 McCollough involved a credit card debt owed by Tim
McCollough, a former school custodian.154 McCollough had opened
the account in 1990, and stopped making payments after he
suffered a brain injury and lost his job.155 When McCollough made
his last payment in 1999, he owed approximately $3,000.156 In
2001, after the account was charged off, Collect America, Ltd., and
its subsidiary, CACV of Colorado, Ltd. (CACV), purchased

149. See id. at 1488 (citing Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1985)).
150. Ehsanuddin v. Wolpoff & Abramson, No. CIV A 06-708, 2007 WL 543052,
at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007).
151. See Kimber, 668 F. Supp. At 1488 (“[Debt Collector’s] argument that its
attorney was ethically authorized to pursue the collections in case the debtors
failed to raise the statute of limitations defense lacks authority.”).
152. 637 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2011).
153. See id. at 947, 958 (reporting the jury’s verdict and affirming the district
court’s decision not to overturn the jury’s verdict or order a new trial).
154. Id. at 944.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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McCollough’s account.157 CACV sued McCollough in 2005 for
$3,816.80 to collect the debt.158 Representing himself, McCollough
replied that the “statute of limitations is up,” prompting CACV to
dismiss the suit two weeks later.159
Although CACV had documented the results of its 2005 suit
against McCollough in its electronic files, in 2006, Collect America
retained Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC (JRL), a law firm
specializing in debt collection, to pursue collection of McCollough’s
debt.160 McCollough’s case was just one of several thousand such
cases for the firm.161 From January 2007 through July 2008, JRL
filed 2,700 collection lawsuits in Montana alone, representing
about five lawsuits filed per day, with about 90% of those suits
resulting in default judgment.162
After CACV transmitted information about McCollough’s
account to JRL, the law firm flagged a potential statute of
limitations problem with the debt.163 Likely referencing the partial
payment rule (and illustrating how collectors use it to circumvent
the statute of limitations), in January 2007, a JRL attorney wrote
to CACV: “It appears that the Statute of Limitations has expired
on this file. . . . If you can[,] provide us with an instrument in
writing to extend the Statute of Limitations.”164 A few weeks later,
CACV responded in an e-mail, entitled “sol extended,” that
McCollough had made a $75 partial payment on June 30, 2004,
thereby extending the applicable five-year statute of limitations to
2009.165 No such payment, however, had been made.166
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 944–45.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 945.
165. Id. (citing Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver v. Story, 862 P.2d 1120, 1122
(Mont. 1993) (holding that Montana’s five-year statute of limitation on an account
stated commences running from the date of the last payment)).
166. According to the court, McCollough had not made a partial payment on
June 30, 2004. Rather, as reflected in CACV’s electronic file, the event that took
place on June 30, 2004, was the return of court costs to CACV for a collection
complaint and summons that CACV had prepared in 2003. Id.
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In April 2007, JRL sued McCollough in Montana state court.
The complaint sought judgment for an account balance of
$3,816.80, interest of $5,536.81, attorney’s fees of $481.68, and
court costs of $120.00.167 At that point, the file for McCollough’s
debt indicated the year 2000 charge-off date; a June 30, 2004, entry
indicating the return of court costs (rather than a partial payment
on the account); and an entry showing that CACV had previously
sued McCollough, who had asserted the statute of limitations
defense.168 The attorney who filed the suit admitted that he did not
seek to determine whether a partial payment had, in fact, occurred
on June 30, 2004.169
In June 2007, McCollough filed a pro se answer to the
complaint, asserting a statute of limitations defense which stated,
in part:
FORGIVE MY SPELLING I HAVE A HEAD INJURY AND
WRITING DOSE NOT COME EASY
(1) THE STACUT OF LIMITACION'S IS UP, I HAVE NOT
HAD ANY DEALINGS WITH ANY CREDITED CARD IN
WELL OVER 8 ½ YEARS
(2) I AM DISABLED . . . .170

In July, McCollough also called JRL and left a message
indicating that he would be seeking summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations.171 The next month, CACV informed the
firm that McCollough had not actually made a payment on June
30, 2004.172 Nevertheless, the firm continued to pursue the case.
In October 2007, the firm served McCollough twenty-two
requests for admission that included the following:
11. Prior to initiation of this suit, Defendant Tim M.
McCollough has never notified plaintiff or any other party in
interest in this action of any disputes regarding said Chase
Manhattan Bank credit card.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 945–46.
Id. at 946.
Id.
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....
14. There are no facts upon which Defendant Tim M.
McCollough relies as a basis for defense in this action.
....
17. Every statement or allegation contained in plaintiff’s
Complaint is true and correct.
....
21. Defendant Tim M. McCollough made a payment on said
Chase Manhattan Bank credit card on or about June 30, 2004
in the amount of $75.00.173

The firm did not notify McCollough that its requests would be
deemed admitted if he did not respond within thirty days.174
Luckily for McCollough, he retained counsel and timely denied all
of JRL’s requests. A few weeks later, CACV instructed JRL to
dismiss the suit “asap” because of the “SOL problem.”175 JRL then
moved for dismissal with prejudice, which the state court
granted.176
At this point, McCollough went on the offensive. McCollough
sued JRL for violations of the FDCPA and the Montana Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, adding state law
claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.177 On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that
JRL pursued the action against McCollough for over four months
after it had obtained information demonstrating that the suit was
time-barred.178 The case then proceeded to jury trial, resulting in
a verdict for McCollough and an award exceeding $300,000.179
Although McCollough’s case represents an extreme example,
it illustrates the mindset of many collection firms and the dangers
that all debtors face in defending aggressive collection actions. Had
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 947.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. The district court granted McCollough partial summary judgment on
his FDCPA claims, and the jury found in his favor on all remaining claims.
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McCollough not defended JRL’s collections suit, the case would
have no doubt ended in a default judgment against him. Rather
than recovering nearly $300,000, McCollough would have been
saddled with a judgment exceeding $10,000.
Aside from judicial interpretations of the FDCPA, some states,
such as North Carolina, have enacted statutes to prohibit the filing
of a consumer collection action on the basis of a debt the plaintiff
knows or should know is time-barred.180 Such statutes and judicial
rulings can be powerful tools towards preventing suits on
time-barred debts. In its 2013 study of the debt buying industry,
the FTC determined that “[d]ebt buyers generally know the ages
of debts they are collecting,” noting further that “[i]nformation
provided to debt buyers . . . generally included the age of the
debt.”181 Accordingly, in states like North Carolina, debt buyers are
on notice that initiating suits on time-barred debts is usually
unlawful. Similarly, in jurisdictions that have deemed the FDCPA
violated by filing suit on a debt that appears to be time-barred,
debt collectors who proceed with suits on such debts potentially
subject themselves to large financial penalties under the statute.182
Going one step further, some courts have held that a debt
collector may violate the FDCPA not only by filing suit on a
time-barred debt, but by simply threatening to do so.
B. Threats to Sue on Time-Barred Debts as Violations
of the FDCPA
The FDCPA makes it unlawful to “threat[en] to take any
action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be
taken.”183 Invoking this provision, courts have held that debt

180. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-115(4) (2017) (“When the collection
agency is a debt buyer or is acting on behalf of a debt buyer, bringing
suit . . . against the debtor or otherwise attempting to collect on a debt when the
collection agency knows, or reasonably should know, that such collection is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.”).
181. FTC REPORT ON DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 19, at v.
182. Such penalties could be imposed under 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(m)(1)(A), (C)
(2012).
183. Id. § 1692e(5).
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collectors may violate the FDCPA by threatening to sue on
time-barred debt.184
According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), threats of unlawful action by collectors are quite common.
In 2015, the CFPB handled 85,200 total debt collection complaints
pertaining to collectors, which were grouped into categories.185 The
most common complaint the CFPB received in 2015 involved
attempts to collect a debt that was reportedly not owed.186 Taking
or threatening an illegal action constituted 11% of the total
number of complaints, with 28% of the complaints within that
category—more than 2,500—involving threats to sue on a debt
that is too old.187
Because the statute of limitations defense is waived if not
asserted, it is possible to file suit on a time-barred debt and simply
wait to see whether the opponent raises that defense. As such,
merely threatening to file suit on a time-barred debt arguably does
not trigger the FDCPA’s prohibition against threatening to take
any action—i.e., filing suit—that “cannot legally be taken.”188
Nevertheless, as the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware aptly stated, “the threatening of a lawsuit which the
debt collector knows or should know is unavailable or unwinnable
by reason of a legal bar such as the statute of limitations is the
kind of abusive practice the FDCPA was intended to eliminate.”189
For this reason, the court found that uttering a threat over the
telephone to sue the debtor on a time-barred debt might violate the
FDCPA.190
Other courts have found FDCPA violations in cases involving
much more subtle threats to sue. For example, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found a
184. See supra Part V.A (exploring examples of FDCPA violations).
185. 2016 FDCPA ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 18.
186. See id. (noting that 40% of debt collection attempts were continued
attempts to collect a debt not owed).
187. Id.
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) (2012) (emphasis added).
189. Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Del. 1991).
190. See id. (denying summary judgment to defendant-collector on the
debtor’s FDCPA claim due to questions of fact regarding whether the defendant
actually uttered a threat over the telephone to sue the debtor).
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collection letter’s warning of “further collection action” sufficient to
state a claim for deceptive practices in violation of the FDCPA.191
Likewise, the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut determined that a law firm’s letter alluding to a
“client” who has “retained” the “law firm” to “collect” in the context
of an “important legal matter” would cause the typical consumer
to believe that litigation was imminent.192 According to the court,
such “vague legal references in the context of debt collection,”
particularly when made by an attorney on law firm letterhead, can
strike fear in the least sophisticated consumer and may induce the
debtor to make a payment on the account, thereby triggering the
partial payment rule.193
Courts have also considered whether a collector’s simple
attempt to collect on a time-barred debt through a collection letter
is, in and of itself, a veiled threat to sue. On this issue, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Management194
determined that “a debt collector [may] seek voluntary repayment
of [a] time-barred debt so long as the debt collector does not initiate
or threaten legal action,”195 and explained that the question of
whether a collection letter threatens legal action is determined by
the language of the letter as examined from the perspective of the
“least sophisticated debtor.”196
191. Stepney v. Outsourcing Sols., Inc., No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997). In that case, the defendants argued that because “the
[underlying] debt obligation is still valid, then the practice of attempting to collect
the debt—short of filing a time-barred lawsuit—must a fortiori be legitimate.” Id.
at *4. Citing Kimber, the court rejected the argument (at least for purposes of
ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss), even though the collection letter at
issue “neither threaten[ed] nor mention[ed] filing a lawsuit.” Id. at *5.
192. Gervais v. Riddle & Assocs., P.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 270, 273–76 (D. Conn.
2007).
193. Id. at 276; see also id. at 274 (discussing cases declaring that a letter
signed by an attorney signals to the unsophisticated consumer that legal action
may be imminent); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456, 1461
(C.D. Cal. 1991) (“The representation that independent counsel has been hired
may unjustifiably frighten the unsophisticated debtor into paying a debt that he
or she does not owe. The FDCPA must be construed to proscribe this means of
collection.”).
194
641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011).
195. Id. at 32–33 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 33.
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Examining the particular letter at issue, the Third Circuit
found no basis to conclude that the letter explicitly or implicitly
threatened litigation.197 Rather, the letter merely indicated that
the debtor’s account had been reassigned; requested the debtor to
call “to resolve this issue”; included a privacy notice; and indicated,
as the FDCPA requires, that if the debtor did not dispute the debt
within thirty days of receiving the letter, the collector would
assume the debt is valid.198 The letter also warned that it was “an
attempt to collect a debt,” which the FDCPA requires,199 and,
importantly, did not offer to settle the debt (a tactic courts in
similar cases have found unlawful).200 Examining the letter in its
entirety, the Huertas court declared:
Since it is appropriate for a debt collector to request voluntary
repayment of a time-barred debt, it would be unfair if debt
collectors were found to violate the FDCPA both if they include
the mandated [notices and warnings] (because inclusion would
threaten suit) and if they do not (because failure to include a
mandatory notice violates the statute). Accordingly, [the debtor]
has not stated a claim under the FDCPA based upon [the
collector’s] letter . . . .201

In the Third Circuit’s view, a straightforward attempt to
collect a time-barred debt that invites the debtor to “resolve” the
debt but is silent as to litigation and merely states that the debt
will be assumed valid if not disputed, which the FDCPA mandates,
does not violate the FDCPA’s prohibition against threatening to
take action that cannot be legally taken.202 Although other courts
agree, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth

197. See id. (stating that “even the least sophisticated consumer” would not
interpret the letter to be threatening litigation).
198. Id.
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11) (2012) (requiring that debt collection letters
disclose the fact that they are sent in an effort to collect a debt).
200. See Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc, 776 F.3d 393, 399–400 (6th Cir.
2015) (distinguishing Huertas on this basis).
201. Huertas, 641 F.3d at 33.
202. See id. (stating that collection letters seeking to “resolve” debts, and
assuming that such debts are valid if not disputed, do not violate the FDCPA).
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Circuit and various district courts,203 once an offer to settle the debt
is added to the mix, the scales tilt in the debtor’s favor.
C. Offers to Settle Time-Barred Debts as Violations of the FDCPA
The cases summarized above—Beattie v. D.M. Collections,
Inc.,204 Stepney v. Outsourcing Solutions, Inc.,205 Gervais v. Riddle
& Associates, P.C.,206 and Huertas—are based on the FDCPA’s
prohibition against “threat[ening] to take any action that cannot
legally be taken.”207 An issue those courts did not address is
whether an offer to settle a time-barred debt may violate the
FDCPA by falsely representing “the character . . . or legal status of
any debt.”208
Effectively extending the FDCPA’s protection—and possibly
creating a circuit split on the issue—the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeal have ruled that the FDCPA can be
violated by a collection letter that is silent as to a possible lawsuit,
but which offers to settle a time-barred debt without notifying the
203. See Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.
2001) (“[I]n the absence of a threat of litigation or actual litigation, no violation of
the FDCPA has occurred when a debt collector attempts to collect on a potentially
time-barred debt that is otherwise valid.”); Shorty v. Capital One Bank, 90 F.
Supp. 2d 1330, 1332 (D.N.M. 2000) (granting defendant collector’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff’s FDCPA claim based on defendant’s
sending plaintiff a notice for a debt which defendant knew was time-barred but
which did not threaten a lawsuit or further collection action); Johnson v. Capital
One Bank, No. CIV. A. SA00CA315EP, 2000 WL 1279661, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. May
19, 2000) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss debtor’s FDCPA claim where
collection letter sent in regards to debtor’s 20-year old debt did not threaten a
lawsuit but did threaten future collection action); Wallace v. Capital One Bank,
168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 527–29 (D. Md. 2001) (finding no FDCPA violation with
respect to collection letters that failed to notify debtor that debts were time-barred
but which did not threaten litigation or collection action).
204. 754 F. Supp. 383 (D. Del. 1991).
205. No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 1997).
206. 479 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D. Conn. 2007).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).
208. Id. § 1692e(2)(a). But see Gervais, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 277 (basing its
decision on § 1692e(5), and also “find[ing] that because [p]laintiff’s debt was
time-barred, [d]efendant’s false threat of litigation in violation of § 1692e(5) also
constitutes a misrepresentation of the legal status of [p]laintiff’s debt under
§ 1692e(2)(A)”).
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debtor that the debt is judicially unenforceable and that partial
payment will revive the statute of limitations as to the entire
debt.209
Courts and administrative agencies have given various
explanations as to why attempts to settle time-barred debts may
falsely represent the character or legal status of the debt.210
According to the CFPB, because few consumers know the
applicable statute of limitations for any particular debt or whether
the limitations period has run, consumers may interpret an
attempt to collect a debt as an implied claim that the debt is
judicially enforceable if they do not pay—a claim that is false for
time-barred debts.211 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has
espoused a similar view.212
In McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC,213 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted a similar rationale in a case involving
two collectors, highlighting each collector’s offer to settle the debt
combined with the lack of notice that the debt was time-barred.214
According to the McMahon court, the collection letters at issue
“misrepresented the legal status of the debts” because “[n]either
[collector] gave a hint that the debts that they were trying to collect
were vulnerable to an ironclad limitations defense;” as such, “[a]n
209. See Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 513 (5th
Cir. 2016) (examining the circuit split and stating that “a collection letter seeking
payment on a time-barred debt (without disclosing its unenforceability) but
offering a ‘settlement’ and inviting partial payment (without disclosing the
possible pitfalls) could constitute a violation of the FDCPA”); Buchanan v.
Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397–99 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing dismissal of
FDCPA claim where collection letter contained a settlement offer with respect to
a time-barred debt and failed to state that statute of limitations had run on the
debt or that a partial payment would restart the limitations period, even though
letter did not explicitly threaten litigation); McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC,
744 F.3d 1010, 1020–22 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding viable FDCPA claims in two cases
involving collection letters that did not threaten litigation, but that offered to
settle time-barred debts without notifying the debtor that the statute of
limitations on the debt had expired or of the effect of a partial payment).
210. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) (2012).
211. CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 20.
212. See FTC Report on Debt Buying Industry, supra note 19, at 47 (arguing
that consumers may believe time-barred debts are enforceable).
213. 744 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2014).
214. See id. at 1020 (stating that debt collectors must not mislead consumers
to believe that time-barred debts are enforceable).
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unsophisticated consumer . . . could have been led to believe that
her debt was legally enforceable,”215 or that the collector “could
successfully sue on the debt,”216 even though such a suit, were it to
be filed, could be easily dismissed.217 The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals agrees, declaring that a settlement offer on a time-barred
debt that makes no mention of its status might be actionably
“misleading” because such an offer “may falsely imply that
payment could be compelled through litigation.”218
In these opinions, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits emphasized
a second major problem with collection letters that fail to disclose
the status of a time-barred debt. According to both courts, an
unsophisticated debtor who receives such a letter might
reasonably assume that some payment is better than no payment,
which is untrue due to the partial payment rule.219 On this point,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals court declared:
Some payment is [in fact] worse than no payment. The general
rule in Michigan is that partial payment restarts the
statute-of-limitations clock, giving the creditor a new
opportunity to sue for the full debt. As a result, paying anything
less than the settlement offer exposes a debtor to substantial
new risk. This point is almost assuredly not within the ken of
most people . . . . It thus is not hard to imagine how attempts to
collect time-barred debt might mislead consumers trying their
best to repay. Without disclosure [regarding the partial

215. Id. at 1021.
216. Id. at 1022.
217. Id. at 1020. According to the McMahon court, a specific threat of
litigation, as prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), “is not a necessary element of
[an FDCPA] claim” because a separate misrepresentation about “[w]hether a debt
is legally enforceable is a central fact about the character and legal status of that
debt,” which itself violates the FDCPA. Id.
218. See Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 399 (6th Cir. 2015)
(relying on dictionary definitions of the term “settle” to show the “various ways
an everyman individual might read the terms”).
219. See id. at 399 (“[A]n unsophisticated debtor who cannot afford the
settlement offer might nevertheless assume from the letter that some payment is
better than no payment.”); see also McMahon, 744 F.3d at 1022 (“[A]n offer of
settlement makes things worse, not better, since a gullible consumer who made a
partial payment would inadvertently have reset the limitations period and made
herself vulnerable to a suit on the full amount.”).
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payment rule], a well-meaning debtor could inadvertently dig
herself into an even deeper hole.220

In another recent opinion on this issue, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals likewise held that “a collection letter seeking payment
on a time-barred debt (without disclosing its unenforceability) but
offering a ‘settlement’ and inviting partial payment (without
disclosing the possible pitfalls) could constitute a violation of the
FDCPA.”221
To protect consumers, several state and local jurisdictions—
including New Mexico, Massachusetts, and New York City—have
passed laws requiring collectors to disclose that consumers cannot
be lawfully sued if they do not pay time-barred debts.222 However,
not all courts agree that offers to settle time-barred debts violate
the FDCPA,223 and greater uniformity is needed regarding the
warnings and disclosures collectors should be required to make.
VI. Proposals
Upon examining the current landscape with respect to
time-barred debts, it becomes clear that greater uniformity of legal
principles and judicial practices is needed to ensure that like
debtors are treated alike. Quite simply, because debt collection law
strives to protect unsophisticated consumers, a given debtor’s
ultimate financial obligation on a time-barred debt should not turn
220. Buchanan, 776 F.3d at 399.
221. See Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., 836 F.3d 507, 513–14
(5th Cir. 2016); see also id. at 511 (“[A] collection letter that is [1] silent as to
litigation, but which [2] offers to ‘settle’ a time-barred debt [3] without
acknowledging that such debt is judicially unenforceable, can be sufficiently
deceptive or misleading to violate the FDCPA.”)
222. See Proposed Rules, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 78 FR
67876 n.246 (proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006)
(proposed Nov. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006) (discussing a
requirement for collectors to disclose to consumers that the collector cannot sue
for a time barred debt (citing N.Y. ADMIN. CODE § 20-493.2 (2018))). See generally
N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.12 (2018); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.07(24) (2017).
223. See, e.g., Johns v. Northland Grp., Inc., 76 F. Supp. 3d 590, 600 (E.D. Pa.
2014) (rejecting debtor’s argument that collector’s use of the term “settlement
offer” misrepresented the legal status of the debt or implied that litigation is
imminent).
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on his or her knowledge of the complex laws in this area, nor should
collectors be permitted to take advantage of the relaxed
evidentiary standards that result from the failure of most debtors
to defend collection suits.
In addition, any set of reforms should accomplish the following
objectives. First, any legal reform should preserve the established
rule that it is not inherently unlawful for a debt collector to inform
a debtor that a debt remains unpaid and provide the debtor an
opportunity to satisfy the debt at a discount.224 Second, debtors
must be informed at the initiation of collection efforts that a debt
is time-barred and that any payment will allow the collector to
pursue payment on the entire debt under a fresh statute of
limitations period.225 Third, to foster uniformity and codify the
general trend among courts,226 suits to collect time-barred debts
should be made explicitly unlawful (in the FDCPA). Fourth, the
ability of collectors to obtain default judgments on time-barred
debts should be curtailed. Finally, all of this should be
accomplished in a manner requiring minimal judicial involvement.
In combination, the proposals below achieve these objectives.
A. Proposed Notices Regarding the Age of the Debt and the Partial
Payment Rule
Under the FDCPA, debt collection notices are governed by 15
U.S.C. § 1692g, which requires debt collectors to notify debtors of
(1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor; (3) a
statement that the debt’s validity will be assumed unless the
consumer disputes it, or any portion of it, within 30 days of
receiving the notice; (4) a statement that if the consumer timely
disputes the debt (or a portion of it), the debt collector will obtain
and mail verification or a copy of a judgment to the consumer; and
(5) a statement that the consumer may request and receive the
name and address of the original creditor, if different from the

224.
225.
226.

Supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 209–222 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 127–141 and accompanying text.
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current creditor.227 Additional required notices with respect to debt
status are likely on the horizon.
In July 2016, the CFPB issued an outline of proposals it is
considering for future debt collection and debt buying rulemaking,
which is expected to be finalized in 2019.228 The CFPB Outline
proposes that additional information be included in validation
notices to assist consumers in identifying the debt, including,
among other things, the consumer’s full name and address; the
creditor’s name at the time of default; the account number with the
default creditor; the amount owed on the default date; the creditor
to which the debt is currently owed; and the amount currently
owed.229 The CFPB further proposes notices be included regarding
consumer rights, such as information on garnishing income.230
Finally, the CFPB proposes notices regarding the status of
time-barred debts and the effect of a partial payment. Such notices
should be required.
The partial payment rule is particularly problematic in the
debt collection context because a collection letter that fails to notify
a debtor that her debt is time-barred or that a partial payment will
revive the statute of limitations could easily “trick” the debtor into
reviving the right to sue on the debt for several years to come.231
To combat this concern, agencies, scholars, and legislatures have
proposed or adopted various notices that would inform debtors of
the true status of the debt and of the effect of a partial payment on
its collectability. Numerous sample notices exist. For example, as
a result of a consent decree between the FTC and Asset
227. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (2012) (listing the five requirements stated
above); see also Johnson v. Capital One Bank, No. SA00CA315EP, 2000 WL
1279661, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2000) (discussing the requirements of § 1692g).
228. See Rosenkoetter & Wier, supra note 54, at *4 (summarizing the CFPB
proposals). See generally CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12.
229. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 376–77 (proposing similar requirements). See
generally CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at app. F.
230. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at app. F, G.
231. See Wallace v. Capital One Bank, 168 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528 (D. Md. 2001)
(discussing this concern, but finding that more than mere silence regarding the
debt’s status is necessary to constitute actionable deception under the FDCPA;
rather, the letter must actually do something to affirmatively deceive, trick, or
induce an unsophisticated debtor into reviving her debt and thus changing her
legal position).
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Acceptance, LLC, the company must now disclose to consumers
whether it knows or believes that a debt was incurred outside the
limitations period using the following language: “The law limits
how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt,
we will not sue you for it.”232
Using similar language, debt collector Northland Group, Inc.,
now utilizes a collection letter that provides the following warning
regarding the statute of limitations:
The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of
the age of your debt, [the creditor/owner of your debt] will not
sue you for it, and [the creditor/owner of your debt] will not
report it to any credit reporting agency.233

Going one step further by mentioning the acknowledgment of
a debt rule, although only with respect to a written
acknowledgment rather than a partial payment, the following
notice is now being used by at least one collector:
Due to the age of your account [the creditor/owner of your debt]
is not able to file suit against you but if you take specific action
such as making a written promise to pay, the time for filing a
suit will be reset.234

New Mexico and Massachusetts have enacted perhaps the
most comprehensive laws to address these concerns.235 The New
Mexico statute declares that the following disclosure is sufficient:
This debt may be too old for you to be sued on it in court. If it is
too old, you can’t be required to pay it through a lawsuit. You
can renew the debt and start the time for the filing of a lawsuit
against you to collect the debt if you do any of the following:
make any payment of the debt; sign a paper in which you admit
that you owe the debt or in which you make a new promise to
pay; sign a paper in which you give up (‘waive’) your right to

232. McMahon v. LVNV Funding LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citing United States v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12–cv–182–T–27EAJ (M.D.
Fla. 2012)).
233. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2015).
234. Langley v. Northstar Location Servs., LLC, No. CV H-16-1351, 2016 WL
4059355, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 2016).
235. See generally N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.12 (2018); 940 MASS. CODE REGS.
7.07(24) (2017).

ENDING LITIGATION AND FINANCIAL WINDFALLS

495

stop the debt collector from suing you in court to collect the
debt.236

My proposal would combine aspects of each of the above
disclosures. My proposed disclosure, which must occur in the first
written communication in which the collector requests payment,
would include a short, plain-language statement informing the
debtor of the time-barred status of the debt and stating that the
collector will not sue to recover it.237 It would also require the
collector to state the effect of a partial payment, and would give
the debtor the ability to avoid that rule by allowing the debtor to
specify his or her intent to pay only the offered settlement amount,
whether in full or in installments. My proposed notice is as follows:
Statute of Limitations: Through statutes of limitations, the
law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Your debt is
currently over __ years old [since the date of charge-off by the
original creditor]. Because of the age of your debt, [the
creditor/owner of your debt] will not sue you for it, and [the
creditor/owner of your debt] will not report it to any credit
reporting agency.
Option 1: Paying Full Offered Settlement Amount Today:
The owner of your debt is offering to settle your debt for [insert
offer amount], which this letter refers to as the “offer amount.”
You may deem it in your best interest to pay the entire offer
amount in one payment. To elect this option, you must check
the box below and submit your payment of [the offer amount]
within the next 30 days. Once we receive your payment, your
account will be satisfied in full, resulting in a zero balance, and
we will not attempt any further collection efforts on this
account, either through informal collection efforts or through
litigation.
□ By checking this box and paying the entire offer amount
today, I agree that the balance on my debt should be reduced to
zero and understand that I will no longer owe any additional
amount on this debt.
Option 2: Making a Payment Towards the Offered
Settlement Amount: If, rather than paying the entire offer
amount within the next 30 days, you instead elect to pay the
236.
237.

N.M. CODE R. § 12.2.12.9.B.
This aspect of my proposal is similar to a CFPB proposed rule. See CFPB
OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 20–21 (requiring a “brief,
plain-language statement” informing the consumer that the collector cannot sue).
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offer amount in a series of smaller payments, we must inform
you that the law would then allow us to seek payment of
the entire amount of your debt. In the eyes of the law, a
partial payment on a debt indicates your willingness to pay the
entire debt and thus restarts the statute of limitations on
collections for the entire amount owed. You may elect to avoid
this result. To do so, however, you must indicate your intent to
pay only the offer amount, and no more, by checking the box
below and submitting your first payment [of $100]:
□ By checking this box and making a partial payment today [of
$100] on this debt, I elect to pay the offer amount in
installments and do not acknowledge that I owe any sum
greater than the offer amount. After making today’s payment, I
agree that I will receive monthly statements requesting
installment payments in the amount of [5% of the offer amount]
until the offer amount has been fully paid. I further agree that
if I fail to make a required installment payment, my only
obligation will be to pay the missed installment payment at a
later date along with a small monetary penalty of [the late
payment fee specified herein].

The first, and most important step, towards treating like
debtors alike and reducing the number of suits filed on time-barred
debts is a contractually enforceable promise not to sue the debtor
on the debt. Accordingly, the proposed notice above includes the
following language: “Because of the age of your debt, [the
creditor/owner of your debt] will not sue you for it, and [the
creditor/owner of your debt] will not report it to any credit
reporting agency.”
Although such a promise is arguably sufficient in and of itself
to prevent a subsequent lawsuit under simple principles of offer
and acceptance, in the event a debtor makes only a partial
payment in response to such an offer letter, a debt owner could
reasonably argue that the partial payment revived the statute of
limitations on the debt and, consequently, the owner’s right to sue
for it. Accordingly, the additional layer of protection proposed in
the final paragraph of the above notice, which shows a clear intent
on the part of both parties to eliminate the partial payment rule
from consideration, is needed.
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B. Providing Option of Avoiding the Partial Payment Rule
The “Option 2” portion of my proposed notice begins with a
statement of the law as it currently stands in most jurisdictions with
respect to a partial payment on a time-barred debt. Because my
proposals aim to prevent debtors from being duped into reviving the
statute of limitations as to an entire debt and seek to ensure that like
debtors are treated alike, the final paragraph of my proposed notice
allows the debtor to affirmatively indicate his intent to pay only the
offered settlement amount. When a debtor elects this option, courts
should find that the partial payment rule, which hinges on the debtor’s
intent, simply does not apply, thereby preventing the collector from
invoking the rule in any subsequent suit filed on the debt.238
As discussed in Part IV, unless a partial payment is made under
circumstances indicating that the debtor intended to pay the entire
debt,239 it is improper to treat the partial payment as having that effect.
However, the partial payment rule is counterintuitive to most debtors,
and a debtor who makes a payment in response to an offer to settle a
debt for a fraction of what is owed would almost certainly not intend to
revive the entire debt. Rather, his intent would be to begin paying only
the offered settlement amount.240 Thus, my proposal simply brings
modern collection efforts in line with the likely intent of most debtors.
238. Supra notes 71–87 and accompanying text.
239. See Gillingham v. Brown, 60 N.E. 122, 124 (Mass. 1901) (recognizing that
“[t]he nature of the [debtor’s payment] is to be determined by the intention of the
debtor as shown by the act, his words, and the circumstances accompanying and
explaining it”); id. at 123 (examining English authorities and concluding that “if
[an alleged] acknowledgment be accompanied by circumstances, or words which
repel the idea of an intention to pay, no promise can be implied”); id. (noting that
for a partial payment to serve as an acknowledgment of a debt, “in the mind of
the party paying, such a payment must be ‘a direct acknowledgment and
admission of the debt, . . . as if he had written in a letter that he still owed the
[entire] sum’”).
240. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 20 (reporting the
Bureau’s belief that “most consumers are unaware of the potential legal
consequences of making a payment or acknowledging a debt in writing,” and that
“many consumers may find it counterintuitive that making a payment . . . may
actually have negative consequences”); cf. Gillingham, 60 N.E. at 123–24
[S]uppose a debtor says to his creditor: “I acknowledge the debt to be
just, that it never has been paid, and that I have no defense except the
statute of limitations. [I] am willing to pay, and I do hereby pay to you,
one-half of the debt, but I do not intend to waive the statute as to the

498

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 (2018)

In effect, my proposal will ensure that any partial payment by the
debtor will not result in the collector seeking payment for the entire
debt. In this respect, my proposal is similar to a CFPB proposed rule
requiring collectors to waive revival of the statute of limitations with
respect to time-barred debt.241 My proposal differs, however, by
requiring collectors to explain the partial payment rule and allowing
debtors to affirmatively reject it. Although the CFPB’s proposal has
merit, my proposal goes to the heart of the partial payment rule itself,
directly negating its effect.242 Unlike the CFPB’s proposal, which
depends on a collector’s promise, my proposal hinges on the debtor’s
intent, which the partial payment rule specifically considers.
Accordingly, when my proposed notice is acted upon by a debtor
through an affirmative statement agreeing to pay only the offered
settlement amount, and no more, a court subsequently deciding
whether to apply the partial payment rule would have no doubt about
the debtor’s intent, which would remain true whether the debt were
sold to other creditors or debt buyers, who might themselves not agree
to the type of waiver proposed by the CFPB. For these reasons, my
proposal has advantages over the CFPB proposal.
C. Proposed FDCPA Amendments
1. FDCPA Amendment Clarifying that Filing Suit to Collect on a
Time-Barred Debt is Unlawful
As an additional layer of protection against any suit seeking to
collect an old debt, this Article proposes an amendment to the FDCPA
rest. On the contrary, I insist on my defense as to that, and I never will
pay any more.” Can it be said that from such a part payment,
accompanied by such a distinct affirmation of the debtor’s intention not
to pay more, but to insist upon his defense under the statute, the law
would have implied a promise to pay the remaining half?
241. See CFPB Outline of Proposals, supra note 12, at 21 (proposing to
prohibit collectors from collecting time-barred debt that can be revived); see also
Sobol, supra note 5, at 378–79 (advancing a similar proposal).
242. See Hart v. Deshong, 8 A.2d 85, 87 (Del. Super. Ct. 1939) (discussing
English common law authorities on the acknowledgment rule and noting that “an
acknowledgment or recognition which expressly negatives the promise to pay has
no effect,” adding that “[w]hen a promise to pay cannot be plainly drawn from all
the surrounding circumstances the acknowledgment is ineffective”).
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plainly stating that filing suit to collect on a time-barred debt violates
the FDCPA.
As noted, the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from using
“any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in
connection with the collection of any debt,”243 including
“threat[ening] to take any action that cannot legally be taken or
that is not intended to be taken.”244 The FDCPA further prohibits
collectors from using “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt.”245 Although the FDCPA provides
guidance as to what constitutes an unlawful collection effort, the
standards are vague, providing room for collectors to argue—in the
few collections suits where a debtor actually mounts a defense or
brings her own FDCPA claim—that collection suits on time-barred
debts are not unlawful.
Although most courts have held that a debt collector violates
the FDCPA by filing suit on a debt that appears to be
time-barred,246 the FDCPA does not explicitly contain such
prohibition. Thus, Congress should amend the FDCPA to
affirmatively make filing suit on a time-barred debt unlawful. My
proposal would simply add a provision to the FDCPA, using
language similar to the North Carolina statute discussed above,
making it unlawful “to file suit or initiate an arbitration
proceeding against a debtor when the debt collector or plaintiff
knows, or reasonably should know, that such collection is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.”247 Following Kimber, my
proposed amendment would make filing suit or initiating an
arbitration proceeding on a time-barred debt an unfair and
unconscionable means of collecting the debt under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f.248 Making the point explicit in the FDCPA will eliminate

243. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012).
244. Id. § 1692e(5).
245. Id. § 1692f.
246. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (stating that courts normally
interpret the FDCPA in the consumer’s favor).
247. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-115(4) (2009) (using language similar
to the proposed language above).
248. Supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
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the ability of collectors to argue that the matter is unclear,
naturally reducing the number of such suits.249
2. FDCPA Amendment Specifying How to Lawfully Collect a
Time-Barred Debt
As discussed in Part II, old debts are still valid debts, and
courts generally agree that the statute of limitations does not
prevent a creditor from seeking to collect the full amount of a
time-barred debt outside of court.250 As the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently explained, there is nothing wrong with informing
debtors that a time-barred debt remains unpaid or allowing them
to satisfy the debt at a discount.251 The question is simply how this
request can be communicated in a fair manner that does not
mislead or deceive the consumer, a matter the FDCPA should more
clearly address.252
Encapsulating the concerns of the federal appeals courts that
have considered the lawfulness of non-judicial collection efforts on
time-barred debt, the FDCPA should be amended to plainly state
that it is not unlawful for a collector to seek repayment on a
time-barred debt via a collection letter, but only if the types of
notices and promises proposed in this Article are included in the
collection letter.
The FDCPA generally specifies the actions a collector may not
take, but there is also value in providing clear guidance for the
honest collector as to what may be done. Although the FDCPA was
enacted to eliminate abusive debt collection practices, the statute
249. See Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487–88 (M.D. Ala.
1987) (addressing argument that filing suit on time-barred debt was lawful).
250. Supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
251. Buchanan v. Northland Grp., Inc., 776 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2015)
(permitting collectors to inform debtors that their debts are unpaid); see also
Buchanan 776 F.3d at 400 (Kethledge, J., dissenting) (noting that it would have
been lawful for the debt collector in the case to send the debtor a letter that simply
recited the amount of her debt and demanded payment in full).
252. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (2012) (prohibiting a debt collector from using “any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation” in a debt collection effort); id.
§ 1692f (prohibiting the “use [of any] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt”).
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was also designed to ensure that debt collectors who abstain from
such practices are not competitively disadvantaged.253 From the
honest collector’s perspective, this proposed amendment will
clarify exactly how a collector may seek repayment on a
time-barred debt, providing a safe haven for collectors against
unwarranted FDCPA suits.
To complement this proposed provision, I further propose an
FDCPA amendment expressly prohibiting debtors from suing
collectors who attempt to collect time-barred debts in the
authorized manner. Given this Article’s objectives to clarify the
law in this area and reduce the impact of debt collection suits on
courts, such a provision will go a long way toward preventing suits
by debtors for collection efforts that most courts agree are lawful.
D. Stricter Standards for Default Judgments
As noted, most debtors do not defend debt collection actions,
leading to default judgments against them, even in cases involving
time-barred debts.254 Although suing to collect a time-barred debt
generally violates the FDCPA, such suits still occur and usually
prevail given that the statute of limitations defense is waived if not
asserted.255
Because traditional waiver rules and default judgment
standards are the true cause of default judgments in such cases,
amendments to the FDCPA cannot truly fix the problem.
Moreover, a debtor who fails to defend a collector’s suit on a
time-barred debt—perhaps due to insufficient financial resources
or a desire to avoid litigation—is probably just as unlikely to file
her own suit to challenge the collector’s actions under the FDCPA.
In addition, although collectors are affirmatively prohibited from
suing to collect a time-barred debt in some states, this appears to
be uncommon, and instead courts simply stand ready to dismiss
253. See McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLC, 637 F.3d 939,
948 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that one purpose of the FDCPA was to prevent
competitive disadvantage for honest collectors).
254. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 12 (stating that
consumers are unlikely to defend themselves against collectors).
255. Supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
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lawsuits if the debtor defends and asserts the statute of limitations
defense.256 Accordingly, my earlier proposal of an FDCPA
amendment making it clearly unlawful to sue on a time-barred
debt will only partly prevent such suits.
To fully fix the problem of collector suits on time-barred debts,
I propose flipping the burden of proof on the statute of limitations
issue. Quite simply, rather than requiring a debtor to prove a debt
is time-barred, those who bring such suits should be required to
prove it is not. To that end, the statute I propose would require the
plaintiff both to certify in its complaint that the debt is not
time-barred and to provide evidence to prove the point before a
judgment, default or otherwise, may be awarded.
My proposal is best accomplished by state statute. Indeed,
some jurisdictions have already enacted statutes that contain
similar requirements. A North Carolina statute, for example,
provides prerequisites for entering a default or summary judgment
against a debtor in debt collection suits initiated by debt buyers.257
The North Carolina statute requires the plaintiff to “file evidence
with the court to establish the amount and nature of the debt,”
provides that only properly authenticated business records are
sufficient evidence, and mandates eight specific items that must
be included in the business record.258 Minnesota has a similar
statute.259 The requirements of a sworn statement and supporting
evidence that a debt is not time-barred would be an easy addition
to such statutes.
256. See CFPB OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS, supra note 12, at 19 (stating that
courts commonly dismiss suits filed to recover expired debts).
257. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-70-155 (2011) (requiring collectors to
submit evidence establishing the nature and amount of the debt owed by the
debtor).
258. Id. § 58-70-155(b). The statute requires the following information be
included in such an authenticated business record: (1) the original account
number; (2) the original creditor; (3) the amount of the original debt; (4) an
itemization of charges and fees claimed to be owed; (5) the original charge-off
balance, or, if the balance has not been charged off, an explanation of how the
balance was calculated; (6) an itemization of post charge-off additions, where
applicable; (7) the date of last payment; and (8) the amount of interest claimed
and the basis for the interest charged. Id.
259. See MINN. STAT. § 548.101 (2013) (requiring debtors to satisfy
prerequisites before collecting debts).
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The primary advantage of this proposal is the impact it would
have on reducing collector suits on time-barred debts. Moreover,
this reform would require minimal judicial effort because
collectors, rather than courts, would be required to screen cases in
advance of filing suit and would be saddled with the obligation of
securing evidence of timeliness. When done right, this will reduce
the impact on courts and should not be overly-burdensome for
collectors, as some are already engaged in the process.260
As a backstop, courts could develop simple case screening
systems for complaints on consumer debts to ensure that default
judgments are not awarded inappropriately. The screening process
would be primarily performed by non-judicial staff, such as clerk’s
office personnel, who would be required to ensure that the
proposed timeliness certification is present. If such certification is
missing from a complaint, clerk’s office personnel could then notify
judges and their staff of the deficiency via e-mail (a process that is
already utilized with many matters in the federal courts),
prompting chambers to issue form orders requesting such
information. If the plaintiff is then unable to demonstrate that the
debt is not time-barred, the case would be dismissed with
prejudice.261 If, however, the timeliness issue remains unclear,
evidentiary hearings could be held on the matter, but only as a last
resort.262
Although one might argue that this proposal is inconsistent
with the standards for awarding default judgments, this criticism
is unfounded. Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
260. See, e.g., Parkis v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLS, No. 07 C 410, 2008 WL 94798,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2008) (describing the detailed practices one law firm used
to ensure that a suit is not filed on time-barred debt).
261. Such a requirement is not unduly burdensome. Cf. Day v. McDonough,
547 U.S. 198, 206 (2006) (permitting district courts to consider, sua sponte, the
timeliness of a state prisoner’s habeas petition).
262. Courts are already empowered to conduct evidentiary hearings in default
cases, and they regularly do so when there are questions as to the plaintiff’s proof
(e.g., in the event damages are uncertain). See, e.g., In re Assigned Consumer Debt
Default Judgment Applications., Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-141546, 56-CV-14-1644, 56-CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-142663, 2015 WL 1087512, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2015) (recognizing that when a
trial court determines not to administratively grant an application for default
judgment made by a debt buyer, it should order a hearing as a matter of course).
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example, already enables courts to be more stringent in awarding
default judgments in debt collection suits.263 Under Rule 55,
although a defaulting defendant is deemed to have “admit[ted] the
plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact” for purposes of
determining liability,264 courts recognize that “a default judgment
cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”265
Accordingly, even in default scenarios, courts are already in the
habit of reviewing complaints to determine that the well-pleaded
factual allegations are sufficient to establish each element of the
cause of action.266
In consumer debt cases, courts can be as stringent as they like
in performing this analysis (particularly under my proposed
statute requiring admissible evidence to prove the suit is not
time-barred). A stringent analysis is only fair. By analogy, where
a plaintiff seeks judgment in a debt collection suit but presents no
proof that the defendant is in fact the person who incurred the
debt, the court would be justified in refusing to enter judgment for
the plaintiff.267 Such rulings reflect the unremarkable premise that
263. In most states, consumer debt litigation is governed by the same state
and federal laws and rules of procedure that govern litigation generally. Spector,
supra note 110, at 261.
264. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
265. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1371 n.41 (11th
Cir. 1997) (“A default judgment is unassailable on the merits but only so far as it
is supported by well-pleaded allegations, assumed to be true.” (citing Nishimatsu
Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also
Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing
cases recognizing that a defaulting party may, on appeal, contest the legal
sufficiency of allegations contained in the complaint, thereby requiring appellate
courts to review the complaint’s allegations).
266. See, e.g., Woods v. Sieger, Ross & Aguire, LLC, No. 11 CIV. 5698 JFK,
2012 WL 1811628, at *3, *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (stating upon default, “the
Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true, except those
relating to damages, [drawing] all reasonable inferences in [p]laintiff’s favor,” but
retains “discretion . . . to require proof of necessary facts and need not agree that
the alleged facts constitute a valid cause of action”). On the merits, the court in
Woods refused to grant plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment on her claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress under an analysis akin to that used
when evaluating a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id.
267. See generally Bearden, supra note 103 (arguing that the court is justified
in failing to enter a judgment where the plaintiff fails to present evidence that
the defendant is the debtor (citing Royal Fin. Group, L.L.C. v. George, No. ED
92972, 2010 WL 1223791, at *3–4 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2010))); see also In re
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a judgment should not be awarded where the evidence does not
support it. Because time-barred debts are by definition no longer
legally enforceable, the same stringent analysis should apply.
A recent Minnesota case, which involved twenty-four
consolidated actions where plaintiffs sought money judgments on
consumer debts, provides an excellent example of the more
stringent approach I propose.268 That case, In re Assigned
Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications269 (Default
Judgment
Applications),
involved
Minnesota
Statute
Section 548.101, which sets forth procedural and evidentiary
requirements for a party seeking default judgment in an action on
a debt where (1) the debt has been assigned; (2) the debt is a
consumer debt; (3) the debt was incurred primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes; and (4) the debt was already in
default at the time it was assigned.270
According to the District Court of Minnesota, Section 548.101
“was designed to provide protections to Minnesotans sued by
commercial debt buyers,”271 and “arose from [the Minnesota
Attorney General’s Office’s] experience with the injustice that may
result when a debt buyer obtains default judgments based on
‘incomplete or inaccurate information’” about the debt.272 The
statute “aims to prevent such situations [where judgments are
improperly awarded] by establishing a standard array of
documents that debt buyers must obtain and bring forward, even
in an application for default judgment—a manner of proceeding
that does not normally require substantive evidence.”273 As an
example, the court noted that where a plaintiff seeks to recover
Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications., 2015 WL 1087512, at
*8–9 (same).
268. See In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications, 2015
WL 1087512 (D. Minn. March 6, 2015).
269. Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-14-1546, 56-CV-14-1644, 56CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-14-2663, 2015 WL 1087512,
at *2 (D. Minn. March 6, 2015).
270. MINN. STAT. § 548.101(a) (2013). See generally Assigned Consumer Debt
Default Judgment Applications, 2015 WL 1087512, at *2.
271. In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications, 2015 WL
1087512, at *3.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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finance charges accrued after assignment of the debt by the
original creditor, the plaintiff “must provide evidence of the
contract terms between the debtor and the original creditor so that
the trial court may determine whether these charges were
authorized by the contract.”274 In addition, “if some transaction
history is necessary to show how the charges were calculated, then
an affidavit explaining that transaction history must be
submitted.”275
Along with the necessary contract terms and transaction
history, the court also mandated additional evidence, such as
detailed interest calculations.276 To combat the problem of default
judgments being awarded against persons mistakenly identified as
the debtor, the court further required “evidence that it is the
defendant who owes the debt, rather than someone else,”277 as the
statute requires.278 Here, the court felt that the debt buyer should
provide evidence, such as the debtor’s social security number, that
it has the right person, as opposed to someone with a similar
name.279 After addressing other evidentiary requirements
mandated by statute, including the requirement of “admissible
evidence establishing a valid and complete chain of assignment of
the debt from the original creditor to the party requesting

274. Id. at *8.
275. Id.
276. For instance, the court noted that “if payment was made on the debt after
it was assigned, a claim for interest should be supported by calculations showing
the time period that simple interest was accrued on each principal amount,” and
“any splitting or merging of accounts which affects the calculation of interest
should be explained and shown.” Id. at *8.
277. Id. at *8–9.
278. See MINN. STAT. § 548.101(a)(2) (2013) (requiring proof that the
defendant is the one who owes the debt).
279. See id. (requiring proof of the last four numbers of the debtor’s Social
Security number, if known); see also In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default
Judgment Applications, Nos. 56-CV-14-1333, 56-CV-14-1439, 56-CV-14-1546, 56CV-14-1644, 56-CV-14-1742, 56-CV-14-2075, 56-CV-14-2076, 56-CV-14-2663,
2015 WL 1087512, at *9 (D. Minn. March 6, 2015) (requiring evidence of the
debtor’s identity).
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judgment,” such as a bill of sale,280 the court then conducted a
case-by-case analysis of the twenty-four cases at issue.281
As these Minnesota authorities reveal, courts and legislatures
are beginning to recognize the importance of ensuring a valid claim
exists before a default judgment is awarded in consumer debt
cases, and have imposed heightened evidentiary standards to
ensure that result. The proposed requirements of a sworn
statement and admissible evidence that a debt is not time-barred
are consistent with this approach.282 With these changes, the
number of suits filed and default judgments awarded on
time-barred debts will be reduced, further ensuring like debtors
are treated alike.
E. Rule 11 Sanctions Against Attorneys Who Sue to Collect
Time-Barred Debts
If my proposals were adopted, filing suit to collect a
time-barred debt would be expressly prohibited by the FDCPA.
Given that the action would be clearly unlawful, rules of civil
procedure could then be used to sanction attorneys for filing suits
where an attorney knew or should have known a suit to collect an
old debt was time-barred.283
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example,
declares that by filing a complaint, a litigant “certifies that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that, among
other things, “the claims . . . and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law,” and that “the factual contentions have
evidentiary support or . . . will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

280. In re Assigned Consumer Debt Default Judgment Applications, 2015 WL
1087512, at *9–12 (citing MINN. STAT. § 548.101(a)(5)).
281. See id. at *12–22 (conducting a case by case analysis).
282. As with the North Carolina and Minnesota statutes, my proposal would
be limited to debt collection actions, leaving unsettled the general rules regarding
waiver of the statute of limitations defense.
283. Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
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discovery.”284 Rule 11 further allows the court to impose “an
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that
violate[s]” these provisions.285 Because my proposal would flip the
burden of proof on the statute of limitations issue, requiring the
plaintiff to present a sworn statement and admissible evidence
that a debt is not time-barred, Rule 11 sanctions would be
appropriate where an attorney fails to adequately analyze whether
a debt is time-barred before filing a collections suit.286 In such
scenarios, the attorney could not properly certify that its claims
are “warranted by existing law,” or that its factual contentions
regarding the status of the debt have evidentiary support.287
Even if my burden-shifting proposal were not adopted, this
result should not change. Although Rule 11 sanctions would be
more appropriate under my proposal, the fact that a defense is
affirmative has not relieved counsel of their Rule 11
responsibilities in other contexts, such as claims that were clearly
barred by res judicata,288 or where there was a clear lack of
personal jurisdiction.289 Also, courts have already imposed Rule 11
sanctions for filing suit asserting a claim for which a statute of
limitations has clearly run.290
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
285. Id. 11(c)(1). In addition, the Rule allows the court, on its own initiative,
to order a litigant or attorney to show cause why its conduct has not violated Rule
11. Id. 11(c)(3).
286. See Columbus v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 641 F. Supp. 707, 711 (S.D. Miss.
1986) (recognizing that “Rule 11 requires attorneys to make a ‘reasonable inquiry’
into both the law and the facts prior to signing any pleading, motion or other
paper”).
287. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
288. See S. Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. Bludworth, 109 F.R.D. 643, 645 (S.D.
Miss. 1986) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s attorneys where
reasonable inquiry into the law of res judicata should have indicated to plaintiff’s
attorneys that all claims were or could have been advanced in a prior action);
Simpson v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., No. 93-155-CIV-ORL-19, 1993 WL 666603, at
*3 (M.D. Fla. May 11, 1993) (same); Columbus, 641 F. Supp. at 711 (same).
289. See Hasty v. Paccar, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 1577, 1578 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(imposing Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who filed suit where personal
jurisdiction was lacking).
290. See Steinle v. Warren, 765 F.2d 95, 101–02 (7th Cir. 1985) (imposing
Rule 11 sanctions for filing a time-barred claim); Van Berkel v. Fox Farm & Rd.
Mach., 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D. Minn. 1984) (imposing Rule 11 sanctions for
filing a time-barred claim); see also Ehsanuddin v. Wolpoff & Abramson, No. CIV
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VII. Conclusion
Filing suit to collect a time-barred debt is unfair and deceptive,
particularly when the suit is motivated by the expectation that the
debtor will not defend and the hope of obtaining a default judgment
in an action that would otherwise be dismissed. Threatening to file
suit on a time-barred debt is arguably worse, as such a threat,
especially one from an attorney, conveys to a debtor that she better
pay the debt immediately or risk making matters worse when, in
fact, the opposite is true due to the partial payment rule. The
simple solution is to require debt collectors to inform debtors who
owe time-barred debts of their true status, including the effect of a
partial payment. However, even greater protections are needed.
The protections proposed in this Article—notices regarding the
enforceability of a time-barred debt, an opportunity for debtors to
avoid the partial payment rule by electing to pay only the offered
settlement amount, FDCPA amendments that plainly delineate
lawful and unlawful collection methods for time-barred debts,
flipping the burden of proof on the statute of limitations, stricter
scrutiny by courts in default cases involving consumer debts, and
Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys who file suits on time-barred
debts—would result in more consistent financial outcomes on
time-barred debts and ensure that most collection activity occurs
outside of court, alleviating courts of this burdensome litigation.

A 06-708, 2007 WL 543052, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (“Because the statute
of limitations, whether raised or not, constitutes a legal bar to the debtor’s
obligation to pay, . . . any suit to collect a debt so barred not only flies in the face
of Rule 11 but the FDCPA as well.”).

